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As the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor is a profound and fascinating figure in American jurisprudence.
During Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign, he promised to appoint a
woman to the Supreme Court, and he appointed Sandra Day O'Connor.' She
was confirmed in 1981 and spent the next twenty-four years on the Supreme
Court bench, retiring in 2005. Before her time on the Court, Justice O'Connor
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1. Beverly B. Cook, Justice Sandra Day 0 'Connor: Transition to a Republican Agenda, in
THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PARTIES 239 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C.
Halpern eds., 1991), infra annot. 109.
2. Justice O'Connor's resignation letter was sent to President George W. Bush on July 1,
2005. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to President George W. Bush (July 1, 2005),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/oconnor070l05.pdf. Justice O'Connor stated as
follows:
This is to inform you of my decision to retire from my position as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States effect upon the nomination and
confirmation of my successor. It has been a great privilege, indeed, to have served as a
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devoted herself to public service as an assistant attorney general, deputy
county attorney, Arizona state senator and senate minority leader, Maricopa
County Superior Court judge, and Arizona Court of Appeals judge.3 Justice
O'Connor's roots are authentically western, having been raised on a working
cattle ranch near the Gila River, bordering Arizona and New Mexico.4 She is
comfortable outdoors in the harsh desert, riding horses, and assisting with
ranch work.5  Yet she is similarly comfortable as an intellectual. She
graduated from Stanford University and Stanford University School of Law.6
Likewise, Justice O'Connor has also been committed to her family as a
devoted daughter, wife, and mother of three.
When she was appointed to the Supreme Court to replace retiring Justice
Potter Stewart, questions loomed about how she would rule on important
constitutional issues, including affirmative action and racial and gender
equality. 7 For instance, during her tenure as a state legislator and state court
judge, she did not face any "true affirmative action" case, and produced no
writing on the issue. 8 When responding to questions about affirmative action
at her confirmation hearings, Justice O'Connor only observed that it was an
issue likely to reach the Court in the future.9 She was correct, and it is her
affirmative action and discrimination decisions that became some of her most
notable opinions.10 As the annotations below demonstrate, commentators and
member of the Court for 24 Terms. I will leave it with enormous respect for the
integrity of the Court and its role under our Constitutional structure.
Id.
3. See DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE 50 MOST INFLUENTIAL WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW
34, 56, 64-65, 209 (1996), infra annot. 113.
4. See SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR & H. ALLAN DAY, LAzY B: GROWING UP ON A CATTLE
RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST vii-viii, xi (2002), infra annot. 50. See also JOAN
BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT
BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 7-21 (2005), infra annot. 111 (focusing on Justice
O'Connor's "pioneer roots").
5. ROBERT W. VAN SICKEL, NOT A PARTICULARLY DIFFERENT VOICE: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 22 (1998), infra annot. 106.
6. Id at 23.
7. See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE
SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 74, 86, 96 (2005), infra annot. 111
(focusing on Justice O'Connor's confirmation). See also Beverly B. Cook, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor: Transition to a Republican Agenda, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND
JUDICIAL PARTIES 239 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991), infra annot. 109, at
238-40 (discussing Justice O'Connor as Justice Potter Stewart's replacement).
8. Thomas R. Haggard, Mugwump, Mediator, Machiavellian, or Majority? The Role of
Justice O'Connor in the Affirmative Action Cases, 24 AKRON L. REV. 47, 48 n.4 (1990), infra
annot. 90.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (addressing affirmative action
in public law school admissions); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249 (2003) (affirmative action
in public university undergraduate admissions); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 903 (1995)
(affirmative action in congressional redistricting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
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legal scholars have reflected on Justice O'Connor's work as a woman, a
conservative, and a former politician.1" Her term ended in 2005, and scholars
are beginning the process of reflecting on her years on the Court as well as her
influence on constitutional law. In an effort to begin and contribute to this
analysis, this selected annotated bibliography focuses on both the substantive
and scholarly materials Justice O'Connor wrote, and the legal scholarship
written about her and her jurisprudence. It is intended as a tool for researchers,
and the categorization is intended to assist them by providing logical access to
this material.
Part I focuses on Justice O'Connor's own extra-judicial writing. The
subsections reflect the areas on which Justice O'Connor focused frequently.
Subsection A compiles her substantive works about the judiciary, judicial
philosophy, federalism, and institutional law. Subsection B highlights Justice
O'Connor's writing on equality and feminism. In addition, Justice O'Connor
spoke and wrote often about the legal profession, specifically addressing
lawyers-these remarks are compiled in Subsection C. Subsection D includes
Justice O'Connor's reflective tributes to other members of the judiciary.
Subsection E includes an examination of Justice O'Connor's substantive
autobiographical works.
Part II of this annotated bibliography compiles substantive works written
about Justice O'Connor and her jurisprudence. These works are arranged and
200, 204 (1995) (affirmative action in federal government subcontracting); Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 103 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (school desegregation remedial measures
through salary increases); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (Mississippi university desegregation); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552,
602 (1990) (FCC minority preference policies); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 476-77 (1989) (affirmative action in municipal subcontracting); N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc.
v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (private club
discrimination); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(Alabama state trooper affirmative action promotions); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara
County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (county agency affirmative
action promotion plan); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 530 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (municipal hiring discrimination); Local 28 of the
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 489 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (pattern and practice discrimination); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984) (tax exemption regarding racially segregated private schools); Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 583 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (pattern and practice
discrimination); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender discrimination);
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 24 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(in-state public university tuition status for nonimmigrant aliens).
11. See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown, Wendy E. Parmet, & Mary E. O'Connell, The Rugged
Feminism of Sandra Day O'Connor, 32 IND. L. REv. 1219, 1220 (1999), infra annot. 66 (arguing
that Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence is influenced by her experiences); Stewart Jay, Ideologue
to Pragmatist?: Sandra Day O'Connor's Views on Abortion Rights, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777, 827
(2007), infra annot. 51 ("Justice O'Connor developed an outlook on abortion rights that can be
traced to her early days as a legislator, in an institution that usually worked only through
compromise, yet also was one in which the underlying statutes sometimes were hopelessly out of
date in ways that harmed women.").
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divided by the type of material and how it was published. Subsection A
focuses on scholarship published in law reviews and academic journals.
Subsection B compiles scholarly monographs and book chapters about Justice
O'Connor. Next, Subsection C includes biographies. Finally, Subsection D
compiles tributes to Justice O'Connor, by Justices of the Supreme Court and
other legal professionals.
This bibliography does not purport to include every document or text written
about or by Justice O'Connor. Rather, it is a selection of scholarly works. It
does not include newspaper or magazine pieces, or bar journal articles.
Likewise, it does not include children's and young-adult works, of which there
are several. 12 It should be noted, however, that such works serve as excellent
sources for anecdotal insights and biographical information, as well as
photographs. The annotations provided are intended to show the myriad ways
that Justice O'Connor's opinions, background, and political leanings have been
scrutinized and analyzed since her nomination to, and retirement from, the
nation's highest Court.
I. WORKS AUTHORED BY JUSTICE O'CONNOR
A. The Judiciary, Judicial Philosophy, Federalism and International Law
1. Sandra Day O'Connor, Fair and Independent Courts: Remarks by Justice
O'Connor, 95 GEO. L.J. 897 (2007). In this short speech given as the
introduction to a conference on judicial independence, Justice O'Connor
underscores the importance of an independent judiciary as the critical
ingredient for the rule of law. Id at 897. Justice O'Connor observes that the
rule of law engenders an increasing amount of anger toward judges. Id. at
897-98. To remedy this problem, Justice O'Connor directs her audience to
"ensure that the public understands that it benefits from judicial
independence." Id. at 898.
2. Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks on Judicial Independence, 58 FLA. L.
REV. 1 (2005). Justice O'Connor provided these remarks when dedicating the
University of Florida's Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center. Id. at 1.
Justice O'Connor reiterates the role of lawyers in maintaining individual
liberty and the rule of law as envisioned under the Constitution, and
underscores judicial independence as a key ingredient for these values and
12. See, e.g., SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, CHICO (2005) (Justice O'Connor's first book for
children, an autobiographical story about her childhood horse, Chico); see also JUDITH BENTLEY,
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR (1983) (biography for young adults); BEVERLY BERWALD,
SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: A NEW JUSTICE, A NEW VOICE (1991) (young adult monograph); LISA
TUCKER MCELORY, MEET MY GRANDMOTHER: SHE'S A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1999)
(photo essay documenting Courtney O'Connor's trip to Washington to see her grandmother);
HAROLD WOODS & GERALDINE WOODS, EQUAL JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF SANDRA DAY
O'CONNOR (1985) (for a junior-high audience).
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rights. Although she admits that judicial independence is difficult to define,1 3
she notes she is "heartened" by its emergence in young democracies such as
the Ukraine, and concerned about the failure of democratic values to develop
in nations such as Zimbabwe. Id. at 2-3. The next part of her remarks
concerns the contemporary disdain for judges and judicial independence
expressed by congressional Republicans. Noting the suggestions for
restrictions on judges and judicial power, Justice O'Connor states that she is
not against limiting judicial terms, but she would not take a formalistic
approach to this issue, noting "as I have said before, I am against judicial
reform driven by nakedly partisan, result-oriented reasoning." Id. at 5-6.
3. Sandra Day O'Connor, Dedication of the Eric E. Hotung International
Law Center Building: Keynote Address, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 651 (2005). At
this dedication for the Georgetown University Law Center's new building for
the study of international law, Justice O'Connor predicts that Georgetown's
international law program is "situated to be the leading global law center in
this country and perhaps in the world." Id. at 651. According to Justice
O'Connor, globalization has caused international law to emerge and affect
courts in the United States and around the world. Id. She defines public
international law as "law regulating the intercourse of nations." Id at 652.
Similarly, she observes that the study of international law deals with domestic
and foreign laws, choice of law rules, regulations that have global application,
giving effect to foreign judicial decisions, and the treatment of aliens. Id.
Justice O'Connor also points to some of the aspects of international law the
Supreme Court has been called to address and observes that the Magna Carta is
the predecessor to the American concept of the rule of law. Id. at 652-53.
4. Sandra Day O'Connor, Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of the
Judiciary, 2 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003). This is the text of Justice
O'Connor's remarks given at the National Judges College in Beijing, China.
Id. at 1 n.*. As she has in other pieces discussing the judiciary, Justice
O'Connor argues that an independent judicial system is the underpinning for
the rule of law. Justice O'Connor identifies three characteristics of a judiciary
committed to the Rule of Law, which she posits transcend national boundaries
to apply to all nations. These characteristics are: (1) an independent judiciary
made possible through the separation of powers to ensure that judges decide
cases on the law and facts before them; (2) judges who act with integrity,
13. In these remarks, Justice O'Connor begins with interesting examples of what judicial
independence does not constitute. It is not "the President's bodyguards kill(ing] the Chief
Justice's pet cat," or the executive branch threatening "to cut the water supply to the Supreme
Court building to prevent the Court from meeting and making anti-Presidential statements," as
was done in the 1990s by then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin. O'Connor, Remarks on Judicial
Independence, supra annot. 2, at 2. And, she says, it is not "the Council of Ministers tr[ying] to
evict the Constitutional Court from its offices," as was attempted in Bulgaria in 1995. Id.
2008] 1103
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courage, and independence in upholding and administering the law; and (3) a
competent judiciary that makes reasoned decisions and articulates justification
for the same. While admitting the challenges inherent in maintaining the
judicial independence, integrity, and competence required to uphold the Rule
of Law, she commends China for its recent commitment to the Rule of Law
and provides examples of the specific steps the country has taken. Id. at 1-7.
5. Sandra Day O'Connor, William Howard Taft and the Importance of
Unanimity, 28 J. SUp. CT. HIST. 157 (2003). This article publishes Justice
O'Connor's remarks delivered at the Supreme Court Historical Society's
Annual Lecture. In this speech, she reflects on the term of Chief Justice
William Howard Taft. Specifically, she examines his quest for unanimity in
Supreme Court decisions and judicial norms of his time, which disfavored
dissenting opinions. She further reflects on the similarities between her Court
and Chief Justice Taft's Court. But unlike Chief Justice Taft, Justice
O'Connor extols the value of dissenting opinions and believes they "can
bolster, rather than undermine, the Court's legitimacy." Id. at 163.
6. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address at the 96th Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348
(2002). This keynote address, given as Justice O'Connor's interest in
international law was beginning to flourish, underscores the importance of the
establishment and growth of international law in U.S. courts.1 4  Justice
O'Connor defines globalization and explains the reasons why U.S. courts are
reticent to rely on foreign law. She further explores why reliance on
international law by U.S. courts will likely change in the near future.
7. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Courthouse Dedication: Justice O'Connor
Reflects on Arizona's Judiciary, 43 ARiz. L. REv. 1 (2001). At the dedication
of two courthouses named in her honor, Justice O'Connor compares the history
of the federal district court-1912 through the date of this dedication-in
Arizona to her own employment history. She observes that both had
"somewhat inauspicious beginnings." Id. at 2. In her conclusion, she reflects
on the architectural innovations of the building, which symbolize the western
sun, sky, and landscape and underscore the importance of these features to
Justice O'Connor. Id. at 6-7.
8. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, Altered States: Federalism and the Devolution at the "Real" Turn of
14. See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE
SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 331 (2005), infra annot. 111
("Moving through her early seventies, O'Connor stepped up her work on the international legal
scene.").
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the Millennium, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 493 (2001). At the inaugural Sir David
Williams Lecture, Justice O'Connor compares the "diffusion of power" in the
United Kingdom with federalism in the United States. Id. at 495. In the
United Kingdom, "power is being devolved from the sovereign Parliament of a
unitary state to national assemblies, and possibly to other regional actors"
whereas in the United States, "power originally resided with the people ... and
was ceded upward to a national government of limited authority," which is
known as federalism. Id. Justice O'Connor concludes by highlighting
similarities and common values shared by each system: democracy and
accountability, efficiency and experimentation, individual liberty, and sense of
community and shared purpose. Id. at 508-10.
9. Sandra Day O'Connor, Juries: They May Be Broke, But We Can Fix
Them, 44 FED. LAw. 20 (1997). Beginning with a brief discussion on the
origin of juries, Justice O'Connor expresses support for the jury system while
she identifies aspects of the system that could benefit from modification.
Justice O'Connor focuses on three aspects of the jury system that need
improvement: the treatment of jurors, the jury selection process, and the
conduct of the trial. Justice O'Connor provides some specific solutions to
these problems: permitting jurors to take notes during trial; providing jury
instructions in writing before the trial begins; permitting people who know
about a case through the news media to participate as jurors, instead of
imposing the current per se ban on them; and improving compensation for jury
service. Justice O'Connor also questions the wisdom of peremptory challenges
and the requirement for unanimity of jury verdicts, looking to examples in the
English legal system.
10. Sandra Day O'Connor, Religious Freedom: America's Quest for
Principles, 48 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 1 (1997). This speech, given in Belfast, Ireland,
was presented at the MacDermott Lecture. Justice O'Connor identifies and
describes four core principles underlying the establishment and free exercise
clauses:' 5 (1) freedom and privacy of religious belief; (2) freedom from
religious-based discrimination and oppression; (3) reasonable accommodation
of religious practices; and (4) avoidance of government endorsement of
religion. She concludes by reflecting on unanswered questions, or "details"
such as the degree of accommodation of religious practices required.
11. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal
Courts, in NAVAJO NATION PEACEMAKING: LIVING TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 171
(Marianne 0. Nielsen & James W. Zion eds., 2005). In the Introduction, the
editors define Navajo peacemaking in the Navajo Nation judicial system as "a
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ").
2008] 1105
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form of conflict resolution ... rooted in Navajo culture and practices but...
modified to take into account present-day issues and resources." Marianne 0.
Nielsen & James W. Zion, Introduction to Peacemaking, in NAVAJO NATION
PEACEMAKING: LIVING TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 3 (Marianne 0. Nielsen &
James W. Zion eds., 2005). The editors further explain that "'[t]he ultimate
goal of the peacemaker process is to restore the minds, physical being, spirits,
and emotional well-being of all people involved."' Id. at 4. The essays
contained in the text provide legal practitioners with information about
peacemaking to assist them in working within Navajo courts and with
peacemakers.
Justice O'Connor's essay is a version of a speech presented at the Indian
Sovereignty Symposium on June 4, 1996. O'Connor, supra, at 176. In this
essay, she recognizes the Indian tribes as one of three types of sovereign
governmental entities, along with the federal and state governments. Justice
O'Connor then highlights the development of tribal courts and observes that
Indian tribes have incorporated particular traditional tribal features into their
judicial systems. Noting that tribal courts must work inside and outside of
complex tribal communities, Justice O'Connor points out the challenges faced
by tribal courts. Yet she reminds the reader that tribal courts deal with some of
the most pressing and complicated issues handled by the judicial system-
family matters, the control of natural resources, tort, and criminal matters-
conceding that the tribal courts often handle these matters more expediently
than the Anglo-American system. Likewise, Justice O'Connor observes
patterns in the tribal system that strengthen the system and serve as an
"alternative[] to [the] conventional adversarial process." Id. at 173. She
concludes the essay by providing specific examples of methods that tribal
courts have developed for solving problems and meeting the needs of their
communities, and she credits the increased number of legally trained
individuals, including lawyers and judges, working with the tribal judicial
system. 16
12. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 35 (1995-1996). This article was published as part of the
symposium issue entitled The Interaction Between National Courts and
International Tribunals and is a transcription of the remarks Justice O'Connor
made at the New York University School of Law Conference on "The
Reception by National Courts of Decisions of International Tribunals." Id. at
35 n.*. Justice O'Connor begins by recalling the International Tribunal at
Nuremberg; she believes the Tribunal served as "a watershed in promoting the
rule of law among nations." Id. at 35. Since Nuremberg, international
16. The examples listed by Justice O'Connor include the Navajo Peacemaker Court, the
Northwest Intertribal Court System, the Indian Dispute Resolution Services, the Native Heritage
Commission, and the Community Relations Service of the United States Department of Justice.
O'Connor, supra annot. 11, at 173-74.
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tribunals have proliferated, and Justice O'Connor explores the relationship
between international tribunals and domestic courts, highlighting the way the
Supreme Court handles such matters of international law. Id. at 35-36. Justice
O'Connor first explores the Supreme Court's limited authority in foreign
relations issues, specifically the applicability of the political question and Act
of State doctrines. Id. at 36-38. Justice O'Connor draws apt parallels in the
relationship between the state and federal courts and the relationship between
domestic and international tribunals, drawing on her own experience as both a
state and federal judge. Id. at 40-41. As explained in the remarks, the title
recalls Immanuel Kant's words about the relationship between domestic courts
and international tribunals. Id. at 41.
13. Sandra Day O'Connor, Commentary, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1063 (1996).
In this short lecture given to judges from the Northern Hemisphere, Justice
O'Connor observes that increases in population will cause the courts' dockets
to grow, and she provides practical solutions for the management of these
ballooning dockets. Her first word of advice is that proper planning for the
future requires identification of "core values of the judicial system." Id. at
1064. As an example, she provides the "Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts," the first of its kind. Id. The core values identified in this plan,
according to Justice O'Connor, are the rule of law, the provision of equal
justice to all, judicial independence, and maintaining the "federal courts as
national courts of limited jurisdiction." Id. Next, she explores the strategies
employed by U.S. courts for the efficient management of an increased
caseload. These strategies include the development of an administrative office
for the federal courts to allow the judges to focus on judicial, rather than
ministerial, matters, the use of magistrate judges and law clerks, and allowing
plea bargains in criminal cases. Id. at 1064-65.
14. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC
AND EXPERIENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES (1996). This work is the
publication of Justice O'Connor's remarks at the Gauer Distinguished Lecture
in Law and Public Policy, and published by the National Legal Center for the
Public Interest. Id. at iii. The text contains the introduction of Justice
O'Connor by then-Judge Kenneth W. Starr, who comments that Justice
O'Connor "has brought clearheaded judgment and common sense" to
unconscionably high punitive damage awards as well as racial quotas. Id. at 4.
Judge Starr also identifies Justice O'Connor as "a Justice for all time,"
embodying the quality of virtue. Id. at 6. Justice O'Connor's lecture is
substantially the same as the remarks made at the Fairchild Lecture. See
Sandra Day O'Connor, The Life of the Law: Principles of Logic and
Experience from the United States, The Fairchild Lecture, 1996 WiS. L. REV. 1
(1996), infra annot. 15. Following her remarks for the Gauer Lecture, there is
a short biography on Justice O'Connor and a section entitled, "Pages of
2008] 1107
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History" which contains the Federalist Papers numbers 78, 79, and 81; An
Apology for Printers, by Benjamin Franklin; Property, by James Madison; and
Democracy in America, by Alexis de Tocqueville. O'CONNOR, supra, at v.
15. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Life of the Law: Principles of Logic and
Experience from the United States, The Fairchild Lecture, 1996 WiS. L. REV. 1
(1996). In this lecture, Justice O'Connor provides what she refers to as "an
interlocking framework of principles [that] must be in place if a nation is to
ensure the liberty of its citizens." Id. at 8.17 She offers these principles to
newly democratized nations, particularly Eastern European and former Soviet
nations. The three principles articulated are an independent judiciary, free
press, and an effective vehicle for the enforcement and maintenance of
fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen.
16. Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword to DAVID C. FREDERICK, RUGGED
JUSTICE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE AMERICAN WEST,
1819-1941 (1994). Frederick's legal history focuses on how the Ninth Circuit
contributed to the development and progress of the western states. DAVID C.
FREDERICK, RUGGED JUSTICE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE AMERICAN WEST, 1819-1941 xi (1994). While serving as a law clerk for
Justice Byron White, Frederick met Justice O'Connor, and she contributed to
the work by authoring the Foreword. Id. at xii. Justice O'Connor observes
that federal case law, as developed in the federal courts of appeals, shaped the
development of the West. O'Connor, Foreword, supra, at ix. She notes the
parts of Frederick's text she finds most "fascinating," which serve as
illustrations of the court's profound role in western expansion and
development: how federal cases played a role in preserving her alma mater of
Stanford University, the exclusion of the Chinese, and the Alaskan gold rush.
Id. at ix-x. Her words conclude with a passage by Wallace Stegner reflecting
on the "big country." Id. at x.18
17. Commentators have praised Justice O'Connor for her efforts toward fostering
democratic values in the international community. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Defeis, A Tribute to
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor from an International Perspective, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 391,
391 (1996), infra annot. 69.
18. The passage as quoted by Justice O'Connor:
There is something to the notion of western independence; there is something about
living in big empty space, where people are few and distant, under a great sky that is
alternately serene and furious, exposed to sun from four in the morning till nine at
night, and to a wind that seems never to rest-there is something about exposure to that
big country that not only tells an individual how small he is, but steadily tells him who
he is.
O'Connor, Foreword, supra annot. 16, at x (citing WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD
SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRING (1992)).
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17. Sandra Day O'Connor, They Often Are Half Obscure: The Rights of the
Individual and the Legacy of Oliver W. Holmes, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 385
(1992). These remarks were delivered as part of the Nathaniel L. Nathanson
Memorial Lecture series at the University of San Diego, sixty years after
Justice Oliver Wendell Homes retired from the Supreme Court. Id. at 385.
Justice O'Connor discusses Holmes's influence as "the chief architect of the
application of our Bill of Rights to the states." Id. In particular, Justice
O'Connor observes that his "strongest influence on current constitutional
interpretation is his view that the First Amendment applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 391.
Justice O'Connor also asserts that Justice Holmes crafted the modem
understanding of the writ of habeas corpus and the extent of the power that
federal courts have to intervene in state court criminal proceedings. Id at 394.
18. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address-Conference on Compelling
Government Interests, 55 ALB. L. REv. 535 (1992). This speech was given
shortly after Justice O'Connor completed her first decade on the Supreme
Court. After an introduction by James L. Oakes, Chief Judge of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where he lauded her
jurisprudence on constitutional questions, commitment to equality, and the
Establishment Clause and intellectual property jurisprudence, Justice
O'Connor spoke about constitutional adjudication, federalism, and historical
analysis. She further explained why she dissented in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,19 and discussed some of the problems when
courts use balancing tests in general. Id. at 543-44.
19. Sandra Day O'Connor, Supreme Court Justices from Georgia, 1 GA. J.
S. LEGAL HIST. 395 (1991). In this short piece, and as its title suggests, Justice
O'Connor provides an interesting sketch of Supreme Court Justices from the
state of Georgia: James M. Wayne, John Archibald Campbell, William B.
Woods, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, Joseph Rucker Lamar, and
Clarence Thomas. Justice O'Connor offers biographical insight into the lives
and Court Terms of each Justice.
20
20. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American
Judicial Tradition, 59 U. CrN. L. REV. 1 (1990). These remarks, given at the
University of Cincinnati College of Law, illuminate the ways that the Judiciary
Act established many "fundamental elements of the Nation's judicial system"
19. 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
20. Justice O'Connor refrained from discussing her colleague Justice Clarence Thomas
except to say, "Justice Thomas's life has been the subject of close public scrutiny this year, so I
doubt there is much I can add to the volumes of print that have been generated already."
O'Connor, Supreme Court Justices from Georgia, supra annot. 19, at 404.
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and in addition "marked the last great event in our Nation's founding and
formed the genesis of our Nation's continuing constitutional revolution." Id. at
3. In describing the importance of the Act, Justice O'Connor discusses the
history of the federal court system, compares the legal revolution made
possible by the Judiciary Act with the French Revolution, and highlights the
contributions to the establishment of the rule of law and judicial administration
made by Chief Justices John Marshall and William Howard Taft. She also
discusses the contributions to an independent judiciary made by Justice Oliver
Wendell Homes, Judge Learned Hand, and Justice Felix Frankfurter. Id. at 8-
10. Justice O'Connor's remarks also address recent legal history as she
observes that the constitutional legal tradition is the "adherence to the rule of
law, even when that adherence draws widespread popular opposition.... [A]n
equally strong aspect of the judicial tradition is that no person or group,
however powerful, is above the law, or can subvert the products of the legal
process." Id. at 10-11. Justice O'Connor holds out the federal judges who
followed Brown v. Board of Education21 as exemplars of this aspect of the
nation's judicial tradition. Justice O'Connor lists many of these federal judges
who made personal sacrifices, sometimes putting their own lives at risk, to
uphold the tradition of the rule of law and the legal process. Id. at 11-12.
21. Sandra Day O'Connor, George Mason-His Lasting Influence, in
GEORGE MASON AND THE LEGACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 117 (Donald
J. Senese ed., 1989). This text focuses on various aspects of the life and
political thought of Founding Father George Mason. Justice O'Connor's essay
highlights the ways that Mason's work and political beliefs influenced
Supreme Court decisions. Noting some of the cases where the Court has
agreed with, or departed from, Mason's views, Justice O'Connor affirms the
Constitution's applicability to modem life.
22. Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword: The Establishment Clause and
Endorsement of Religion, 8 J.L. & REL. 1 (1990). In this short piece written
during the Bicentennial of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Justice
O'Connor presents "the principle underlying the Establishment Clause [of the
First Amendment:] that government may not make a person's religious beliefs
relevant to his or her standing in the political community by conveying a
message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."
Id. at 2. As Justice O'Connor explains, this is because "we live in a pluralistic
society," where citizens have wide-ranging religious beliefs, or none at all. Id.
She further observes that the principle underlying the Establishment Clause is
consistent with its history. Id.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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23. Sandra Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in
England and the United States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643 (1986). This
substantive law review article reflects Justice O'Connor's belief in the
importance of understanding the laws of foreign jurisdictions. To Justice
O'Connor, such comparisons yield important questions and an opportunity to
examine the character of those differences. Here, as the title suggests, Justice
O'Connor focuses on judicial review of administrative agencies and actions in
the United States and England, examining factors that account for the
differences between the two nations' approaches to separation of powers.
Justice O'Connor also focuses on the doctrine of standing, observing the
connection between standing and statutory preclusion, and contrasts the
standing requirements between England and the United States.
24. Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword: The Changing Role of the Circuit
Justice, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 521 (1986). When Justice O'Connor replaced
Justice Potter Stewart on the Supreme Court, she became the Circuit Justice for
the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 521. In this short piece introducing a survey of Sixth
Circuit law, Justice O'Connor discusses the challenges of "riding the circuit"
and offers anecdotes of the same. Circuit riding persisted until 1869 when
Congress established the circuit court system. 2  Id. at 521-23. Justice
O'Connor also explains the contemporary role and responsibility of the Circuit
Justice. Providing statistics about cases dealt with and disposed of in the 1983
term, O'Connor observes that the most significant responsibility of the Circuit
Justices is granting stays of execution in criminal cases. Id. at 525.
25. Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1 (1984). This article was presented as the Sumner Canary Lecture at
Case Western Reserve School of Law. Justice O'Connor discusses judicial
federalism and explains how the adequate and independent state ground
doctrine strengthens both the federal and state courts. Yet she also points out
ambiguities in the doctrine that arise in certain instances. Justice O'Connor
also examines the then-recent case of Michigan v. Long23 to highlight the new
approach for resolving some of these ambiguities, asserting that the case
"preserves state court autonomy and ensures Supreme Court oversight in the
interests of uniformity." Id. at 7-8. Finally, Justice O'Connor explores two
additional issues related to Supreme Court review of state decisions, abstention
and federal habeas corpus, which are rooted "in respect by the federal courts
for state court proceedings." Id. at 9.
22. Judiciary Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44-45 (1869) (establishing the circuit court system and
providing for the appointment of circuit court judges).
23. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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26. Sandra Day O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal
and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 801 (1981). This is then-Judge O'Connor's first law review
article, published shortly before her ascendancy to the Supreme Court. It
provides a framework for her understanding of the relationship between the
state and federal judiciary. The article reflects her belief that federal courts
should show deference to state court rulings, as well as support the finality of
state court judgments, even on federal constitutional issues.
B. Equality and Feminism
27. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Legal Status of Women: The Journey
Toward Equality, 15 L.J. & RELIGION 29 (2000-200 1). In these remarks on
the legal and social status of women, Justice O'Connor begins by sketching the
development of women's rights in the United States. She remarks that "the
path taken by American women can offer useful insight to the international
observer," although neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights expressly
provided women with any rights. Id. at 29-30. Juxtaposing the emergence of
women's rights in the United States, Justice O'Connor highlights how
international agreements and treaties such as the Charter of the United Nations,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, have served to
make women's rights synonymous with human rights. Id. at 33-35. She
offers three lessons to women throughout the world from the American
experience of the development of women's rights: (1) judicial or legislative
change is more likely to be successful if preceded by public opinion; (2) in
addition to democratic institutions and documents ensuring equality, all
women must participate in political life; and (3) substantial change requires
that people transcend their differences. Id. at 35. Finally, Justice O'Connor
recognizes Tunisia as a leader among Arab, North African, and Middle Eastern
nations in securing women's rights. Id. at 36.
28. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Supreme Court and the Family, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 573 (2001). This is a transcript of a short talk given by Justice
O'Connor as part of the University of Pennsylvania's Law School
sesquicentennial celebration and Family Law Symposium. After observing
that the family is "at the heart of . . . American law," Justice O'Connor
discusses the challenges posed by the development of family law
jurisprudence. Id. at 573-74. She observes that the Supreme Court is merely
"one voice" in the development of the same. Id. at 574. Further, she argues
that because family cases involve the "intertwined" rights of individuals, the
24. See also Barbara Olson Bruckmann, Note, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Trends
Toward Judicial Restraint, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1185 (1985), infra annot. 100 (describing
Justice O'Connor's judicial restraint and respect for federalism).
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application of due process jurisprudence may not be the most appropriate
avenue for resolving these disputes. Id. at 575-76. Justice O'Connor
discusses three Supreme Court cases to illustrate her point: Troxel v.
25 26 27Granville, Moore v. City of East Cleveland,26 and Santosky v. Kramer.
29. Sandra Day O'Connor, The History of the Women's Suffrage Movement,
49 VAND. L. REv. 657 (1996). At the beginning of this article, which was
originally delivered as a speech commemorating the 75th anniversary of the
Nineteenth Amendment, Justice O'Connor offers "a flavor" of the battle waged
by women for the right to vote. Id. at 657-68 & n.*. She continues to posit,
"what was it all for?" Id. at 668. To answer this query, Justice O'Connor
discusses the effect of women on elections and politics and observes that
women's votes reflect individualism rather than the vote of their husbands or
other women. Id. at 669-70. In discussing the advances that American
women have made, Justice O'Connor's tone is positive, even as she observes
that this progress has been "fitful." Id. at 670.
30. Sandra Day O'Connor, Testing Government Action: The Promise of
Federalism, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35 (Stephen E.
Gottlieb ed., 1993). This text is a compilation of papers presented at a
conference hosted by Albany Law School on September 26-28, 1991, focusing
on the concept of compelling government interest. In the work's introduction,
which explores "the logic of overriding public interests," Gottlieb sets forth the
positions of each contemporary Supreme Court Justice. Stephen E. Gottlieb,
Introduction: Overriding Public Values, in PUBLIC VALUES IN
25. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). This case involved the issue of visitation rights for grandparents.
In summarizing the facts of this case, Justice O'Connor eloquently states:
Troxel is a human drama, centered on a particular family and its particular
circumstances. The case tells a compelling story of parents who are grieving the loss of
their son and trying to carry on his memory by maintaining a close relationship with his
daughters. There is a mother who is seeking both to include her daughters'
grandparents in their lives, and also to move on, remarry, and create a new family for
her children. And there are two girls who lost their father but who have immediate and
extended family members literally battling to spend time with them. As a matter of
constitutional law, Tommie Granville may get to make the final decision as to whom
her children will visit. But as a matter of parenting and family relationships, the
decision is a difficult one and one for which the law has little to offer.
O'Connor, The Supreme Court and the Family, supra annot. 28, at 577.
26. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated a housing ordinance
that restricted occupancy in a home to those members of a single family, recognizing that the
family encompasses more than the traditional nuclear family. Id. at 504.
27. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). This case held that the "clear and convincing" evidentiary
standard must be applied to determine parental unfitness and terminate parental rights. Id. at 769.
According to Justice O'Connor, this case "reminds us that underneath every legal debate over
family law is a family in crisis." O'Connor, The Supreme Court and the Family, supra annot. 28,
at 579.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 2-3, 7 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993). For Justice
O'Connor, he quotes her words from City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,28
and notes that for her, the concept of strict scrutiny is "central to the protection
of liberty secured by the Constitution." Id. at 2. Justice O'Connor's essay is in
Part 1, which focuses on the legitimate source of a compelling interest, or as
Gottlieb puts it, "the appropriate grounds from which to conclude that
something we find desirable should be treated as an overriding public value or
'interest."' Id. at 31.
Justice O'Connor's essay, Gottlieb writes further, portrays compelling state
interests as "inferences from the structural 'spirit' of the Constitution and
subsequent history." Id. She explores and analyzes the roots, scope, and
permissibility of governmental authority, which infringes on personal liberty.
In evaluating how courts resolve the conflict between government authority
and personal liberty, Justice O'Connor observes that balancing tests, although
frequently employed, are inadequate. O'Connor, Testing Government Action,
supra, at 35, 38-39. Rather, she maintains that the Constitution, which blends
competing but complimentary concerns, is the starting point in the analysis to
resolve the conflict between state interests and individual rights.
31. Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword, First Women: The Contribution of
American Women to the Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. xiii (1994). This short piece
highlights some of the first women to make significant contributions to the
legal profession. Justice O'Connor discusses the contributions of Myra
Bradwell, 29 Antoinette Dakin Leach, 30 Clara Shortridge Foltz, 3 1 and Crystal
Eastman.
32
28. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). This case held that a city's plan to set aside thirty percent of
contracts for "Minority Business Enterprises" to remedy past discrimination in the construction
industry was unconstitutional because the plan was not narrowly tailored and the city failed to
demonstrate a compelling government interest. Id. at 477, 505, 508.
29. Bradwell was one of the first women to seek admission to the bar to practice law.
O'Connor, First Women, supra annot. 31, at xiii. Both the Illinois Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court found that because married women could not enter into binding contracts,
Bradwell could not enter into an attorney-client relationship. Id. at xiv. Having been denied
admission to the bar to practice law, Bradwell instead worked for women's suffrage and for other
reforms to improve the legal status of women. Id. However, twenty-one years later in 1890, the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed itself, and admitted Bradwell. Id.
30. Leach was granted admission to the Indiana bar, where she practiced for the remainder
of her life despite the negative attitude from her colleagues. Id. She was one of the first lawyers
to prepare filings using a typewriter, and was noted to be apt at finding applicable case law to
support her arguments. Id.
3 1. Justice O'Connor characterizes Foltz as a woman of many "firsts," including being the
first female law student at Hastings College of Law, one of the first women admitted to the
California bar, the first woman to practice law in San Diego, and the first woman to serve as a
deputy district attorney in California. Id. at xiv-xv.
32. As a sociologist and lawyer, Eastman worked to eradicate a range of societal problems
including "the effect of industrialization on urban workers." Id. at xv. She published CRYSTAL
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32. Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546
(1991). Marking the hundred-year anniversary of the admission of women into
New York University School of Law, Justice O'Connor begins by highlighting
the advances of women in the legal profession, tracking her own experience
from being offered a position as a legal secretary after graduating from law
school to serving as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. She provides examples and
discusses her present ideas about gender differences, noting that contemporary
ideas about gender differences are eerily similar to past gender stereotypes and
rationales invoked to keep women out of the public sphere. Id. at 1549-53.
To be sure, Justice O'Connor admits that women bear the burden of
childrearing and housekeeping to a greater extent then men and again cites her
own experience of resuming her career in earnest only after raising children.
Therein lies the dilemma for Justice O'Connor and the crux of the article: the
Court's treatment of pregnancy, which she outlines succinctly. To conclude,
Justice O'Connor remarks,
[w]omen do have the gift of bearing children, a gift that needs to be
accommodated in the working world. However, in allowing for this
difference, we must always remember that we risk a return to the
myth of the "True Woman" that blocked the career paths of many
generations of women.
Id. at 1557.
C. The Legal Profession and Professionalism
33. Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism: Remarks at the Dedication of
the University of Oklahoma's Law School Building and Library, 2002, 55
OKLA. L. REv. 197 (2002). In this dedication,33 Justice O'Connor begins by
observing the public dissatisfaction with the bar as well as the dissatisfaction
among lawyers themselves, as manifested in the high incidents of depression,
substance dependency, divorce, and suicide among the group. Id. at 198.
Justice O'Connor argues that this disenchantment is rooted in the decline of
professionalism. Id. She reminds lawyers to be "mindful of the social aspects
of the attorney's power and position as an officer of the court." Id. To this
end, Justice O'Connor urges her audience of law students to embrace public
service as the route to return to the standard of professionalism that was once
at the heart of the practice and public perception of law. Likewise, she urges
future attorneys to spurn intra-attomey conflict and restore civility. Id. at 199.
EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (Paul Underwood Kellogg ed., 1910), served as the
only female member of the New York State Employer's Liability Commission, and worked to
pass early worker's compensation laws. O'Connor, First Women, supra annot. 31, at xv.
33. In addition to her argument about professionalism, Justice O'Connor remarks that
Marion Rice Kirkwood, a professor at the Oklahoma Law Center during the 1930s and 40s, "had
a direct effect on my study of law" as her real property and water law professor at Stanford Law
School. O'Connor, Professionalism: Remarks at the Dedication of the University of Oklahoma's
Law School Building and Library, 2002, supra annot. 33, at 197.
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In arguing that lawyers have a need to make a worthwhile contribution to
society, Justice O'Connor reminds her audience of the growing number of poor
individuals in need of legal assistance and pushes her audience toward working
to meet this need. Justice O'Connor summarizes her advice as "the importance
of doing good while doing well." Id. at 199-201.
34. Sandra Day O'Connor, "Professionalism," 78 OR. L. REV. 385 (1999).
In dedicating the William W. Knight Law Center at the University of Oregon,
Justice O'Connor speaks about professionalism, beginning with the
observation that many lawyers are unhappy with their chosen profession and
many members of the public have a dismal view of the same. Id. at 385-87.
Justice O'Connor believes that greater civility is required of lawyers, and urges
lawyers to view litigation and legal argument as discourse-not as war, battle,
or siege. Id. at 387-88. She concludes that service to the public--especially
service to the growing number of underserved poor-is the key ingredient of
professionalism. Once lawyers devote themselves to public service, Justice
O'Connor believes that they will become less dissatisfied, as such work "is the
sustenance that brings meaning and joy to a lawyer's professional life." Id. at
391.
35. Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, FED. LAWYER, Sept. 1998, at 20.
Justice O'Connor provides three reasons for domestic lawyers to understand
the law of foreign jurisdictions: (1) to be able to proficiently apply foreign law
in international disputes; (2) to discover inventive ways to improve our legal
system; and (3) to further cooperation among nations to reduce the high costs
of transnational litigation. Id. at 21. She predicts that the U.S. Supreme Court
will increase its use of law from foreign common-law courts, which have
struggled with similar constitutional issues as the United States, including
equal protection, due process, and the existence of the rule of law in
constitutional democracies. Id. at 20-21. She cites the South African court as
an example of a court that upholds civil rights. Id. at 21.
36. Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks of Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 383
(1997). Speaking at a ceremony where the Seton Hall Law Review,
Legislative Bureau, and Women's Law Forum awarded her the fifth Sandra
Day O'Connor Medal of Honor, Justice O'Connor provides two concrete
pieces of guidance based on the lessons she learned in her professional life.
First, she advises her audience of future lawyers to "strive for excellence." Id.
at 384. To illustrate this point, she recalls the early years in her career when
she was offered only a job as a legal secretary out of law school, opened her
own law practice dealing with commonplace legal issues, and started as a
temporary lawyer at the Arizona Attorney General's Office. Yet she reflects
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that, despite "starting at the bottom," she approached every client and every
task striving for excellence and working as hard as she could. Id at 385. She
advises the future law graduates to do the same, while noting some of the
benefits of working at the bottom: "[n]o one learns more about a problem than
the person at the bottom." Id. Next, Justice O'Connor reminds her audience to
involve themselves in the communities in which they live and work, and
specifically suggests that they involve themselves by providing pro bono
services to the growing number of people who cannot afford legal assistance.
Id. at 385-86.
37. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, Meeting the Demand for Pro Bono Services, 2 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1
(1992). Justice O'Connor begins by setting forth statistics about unmet legal
needs among poor individuals and notes some specific areas where pro bono
service is most necessary. She offers a three-part solution to remedy the
problem of unmet legal needs: (1) law students should provide legal services
through work in mandatory clinics; (2) educating individual clients needing
pro bono assistance about legal solutions; and (3) lawyers practicing in all
areas, even the most arcane and specialized, should get involved with
providing pro bono services.
38. Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword to RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAWYERS,
COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM: THE AGENDA FOR REFORM xi (1989). Judge
Rudolph Gerber addresses the public hostility toward, and dissatisfaction with,
lawyers and problems with the judicial and legal system reflected by the same.
Judge Gerber's introduction provides a methodology for reflecting upon and
critiquing the legal system, defining it as a "salad" of philosophical,
anthropological, and linguistic models including those frameworks advanced
by thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Levi-Strauss, and Derrida. RUDOLPH
J. GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM 7-8 (1989). Judge
Gerber offers some solutions to the problem, observing that "major surgery,"
rather than an "occasional Band-Aid," is required. Id. at 6. In Justice
O'Connor's brief foreword, she observes that power coupled with economic
self-interest tempts even "public-spirited" attorneys to "manipulate the system
of justice for personal gain." O'Connor, supra, at xi. Briefly critiquing
lawyers, law students, and law school methodology, she agrees with Judge
Gerber that profound challenges face the legal profession and "share[s] his
basic concern to rekindle a spirit of professional responsibility." Id. at xi-xii.
Justice O'Connor echoes the changes Judge Gerber advocates to the law school
curriculum as well as his view that the profession must maintain high ethical
standards.34 Id. at xii.
34. In this Foreword, Justice O'Connor supports the following changes to law school
curriculum: (1) law schools should admit students committed to public service and support them
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39. Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 5 (1998).
Speaking at the dedication of the Washington University School of Law's new
Anheuser-Busch Hall, Justice O'Connor posits that the practice of law has
become "pointless and no fun" as she observes the dismal public perception
and the terrific economic pressures of the legal market. Id. at 5. She then
shifts to a discussion about a lawyer's obligations to her colleagues, legal
institutions, and the public, and observes that many lawyers are dissatisfied
with their chosen field. Advocating for greater civility, colloquialism, respect,
and understanding, Justice O'Connor asserts that members of the bar must spur
the change and set the example for the future of the profession. As Justice
O'Connor embraces public service as the vehicle for professionalism, she aptly
observes that public service is what distinguishes the practice of law from a
business enterprise. Id. at 12. She reminds her audience that there is a
growing need for engaging in rewarding pro bono service. Id. at 12-13.
40. Sandra Day O'Connor, Legal Education and Social Responsibility, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 659 (1985). In a speech dedicating the new wing of
Fordham University Law School, Justice O'Connor suggests that lawyers not
only have obligations to be proficient in substantive and procedural aspects of
the law, but that lawyers also have moral responsibilities. Therefore, law
schools must foster civil and moral responsibility among their students so they
will have "a habit of pro bono service." Id. at 661. Justice O'Connor observes
that such programs are already in existence at Fordham.
41. Sandra Day O'Connor, Professional Competence and Social
Responsibility: Fulfilling the Vanderbilt Vision, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1983). In
this address, given at the dedication to Vanderbilt Law School's Alyne
Queener Massey Library, Justice O'Connor observes that the history and
mission of the law school is "to prepare the whole lawyer, the complete
lawyer, the great lawyer." Id. at 2. She reflects that this charge requires
professional competence in understanding the legal doctrine, practical skills
training, knowledge of and adherence to high ethical standards, and a
commitment to pro bono service.
D. Tributes
42. Sandra Day O'Connor, Response, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1673 (2006). Justice
O'Connor's brief remarks honor the legacy of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist. She recounts their years at Stanford and their shared western
in pursuing a career in public service over a more lucrative career in the private sector; (2) law
schools should teach students to be "public trustees," that is, to serve the public as counselors,
negotiators, legislators, administrators, civil servants, judges, and conciliators; and (3) law
schools should provide students with an appreciation of the ethical conflict between the pursuit of
wealth and the duties owed to clients. O'Connor, Foreword to GERBER, supra annot. 38, at xii.
[Vol. 57:10991118
A Selected Annotated Bibliography
heritage. Admiring his character and skill she observes that "Bill Rehnquist
was a terrific Chief Justice." Id. at 1674.
43. Sandra Day O'Connor, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 3 (2005). Justice O'Connor provides a biographical sketch of Chief
Justice Rehnquist as a memorial. She highlights their years at Stanford, his
clerkship for Justice Robert Jackson, as well as personal details from his life,
such as his sense of humor. Describing his work as the Chief Justice
admirably, she observes his skilled handling of President Clinton's
impeachment proceedings. Justice O'Connor goes on to observe that as Chief
Justice, Rehnquist served to make the relationships among the Justices
"harmonious," functioning in accordance with the role of the Court as
envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution. Id. at 5.
44. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lending Light to Countless Lamps: A Tribute to
Judge Norma Levy Shapiro, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2003). In this short tribute
to Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Norma Shapiro, Justice O'Connor
comments on Judge Shapiro's significant "firsts": (1) she was one of the first
women to be a partner at a major Philadelphia law firm; (2) she was the first
woman to be appointed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania; and (3) she was the first woman appointed to the bench for the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 2. Justice O'Connor also underscores
Judge Shapiro's commitment to women and public service as shown by Judge
Shapiro's founding of the Women's Law Project. Id. at 2. Finally, Justice
O'Connor reflects on Judge Shapiro's willingness to mentor other women,
including Justice O'Connor herself. Id.
45. Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 56 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 4 (1999). In this tribute to Justice Powell, originally delivered at
his funeral in Richmond, Virginia, Justice O'Connor sketches some of the
highlights of his life. Justice O'Connor discusses Justice Powell's profound
impact on her when she joined the Court-according to Justice O'Connor, no
other Justice did more to help her adjust to her new position. Because of
Justice Powell's open door policy, he and Justice O'Connor discussed many
cases and issues, and she talks about how she misses these conversations. Id.
at 6. Justice O'Connor also recalls dancing with Justice Powell on several
occasions. Id. She concludes her remarks by stating, "[f]or those who seek a
model of human kindness, decency, exemplary behaviour and integrity, there
will never be a better man." Id.
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46. Sandra Day O'Connor, Warren E. Burger: Reflections of a Colleague,
74 TEX. L. REv. 209 (1995).35 This is a transcript of Justice O'Connor's
remarks at the memorial service for Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, on June
29, 1995. Justice O'Connor developed a longstanding friendship with Chief
Justice Burger beginning in 1979. This relationship continued during the years
Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Burger served on the Supreme Court,
where Chief Justice Burger led the Court "through a time of change." Id. at
210. Justice O'Connor highlights three cases during Chief Justice Burger's
term that particularly influenced her: Reed v. Reed,36 United States v. Nixon,37
and INS v. Chadha.
38
47. Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a
Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1217 (1992). Justice O'Connor begins this short
tribute by reflecting on the impact of Brown v. Board of Education,39 drawing
on her Southern roots and the lack of racism she experienced and witnessed
growing up in Arizona. She describes the effect Justice Marshall's narrative
storytelling and commitment to social justice had on her, especially during her
early years on the Court. Justice O'Connor's remark, "[n]o one could help but
be moved by Justice Thurgood Marshall's spirit; no one could avoid being
touched by his soul," demonstrates her admiration for Justice Marshall. Id. at
1220.
48. Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101
HARV. L. REv. 395 (1987). On the occasion of Justice Powell's retirement
from the Court, Justice O'Connor contemplates "the role of individual
character in the work of the Court," and then shifts her attention to "the man
himself and especially on why his leaving is poignant for those of us who
remain." Id. at 395. To this end, Justice O'Connor discusses the legal issues
of particular importance to Justice Powell-public education, military service,
and family-and demonstrates how these issues are reflected in his written
opinions.
35. This Memorial is also published as Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme
Court of the United States, Eulogy for the Honorable Warren E Burger: Chief Justice, Supreme
Court of the United States (June 29, 1995), in 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 9 (1995). A similar
tribute is published as Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Warren E. Burger, 22 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 7 (1996).
36. 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional a statute that preferred males over
equally qualified females on the grounds that the preference was based solely on discrimination
prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
37. 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974) (compelling President Nixon to release tapes of
conversations).
38. 462 U.S. 919, 957-59 (1983) (finding a congressional one-house veto invalid as
violating the requirement of Bicameralism and the Presentment Clauses).
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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E. Autobiographical Works
49. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF
A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (Craig Joyce ed., 2003). In the Preface, Justice
O'Connor observes that the text reflects her thoughts about "themes in our
national history," such as the marble panel depicting the Majesty of the Law at
the Supreme Court, an image symbolizing "the liberties and rights of the
people[,] the defense of human rights[,] and the protection of innocence." Id.
at xvi. The image also "embodies the hope that impartial judges will impart
wisdom and fairness when they decide the cases." Id. In this work, Justice
O'Connor examines these themes, as well as "the history of the Constitution,
of the Court, and of some former [Justices,] of the expansion of roles for
women, and of the Rule of Law worldwide." Id. At least one chapter in this
book has also been republished as an article.
40
50. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR & ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A
CATTLE RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (2002). This biography,
written by Justice O'Connor and her brother Alan Day, is an account of
growing up on the Lazy B Ranch on the border of New Mexico and Arizona,
along the Gila River. The book reflects the great influence that the ranch, the
western heritage, and her parents, affectionately known as "Da" and "Mo," had
on Justice O'Connor. See id. at 23-49. An underlying theme is survival and
hard work-of the Day family, its ranch hands, cattle and other wildlife-in
spite of the harsh desert environment of the land of the Lazy B. It includes a
reflection on the local history of this area as well as several photographs
depicting the ranch, the Day family, and the well-loved ranch hands and
cowboys. See generally id.
II. WORKS ABOUT JUSTICE O'CONNOR
A. Substantive Law Review Articles Written About Justice O'Connor
51. Stewart Jay, Ideologue to Pragmatist?: Sandra Day O'Connor's Views
on Abortion Rights, 39 ARiz. ST. L.J. 777 (2007). In this substantive and
critical analysis of Justice O'Connor's views on abortion, Jay argues that
Justice O'Connor is neither a pragmatist nor an ideologue. Id. at 778. Rather,
he maintains that she approaches the issue of abortion from the perspective of
both "a legislator and a woman." Id. In supporting his argument, Jay begins
by describing Justice O'Connor's position on abortion as she explained it at
her confirmation hearings. He highlights that, as an Arizona legislator, Justice
O'Connor refused to vote in favor of legislation to repeal and criminalize
abortion, but nevertheless voted in favor of measures to restrict access to the
40. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, WYO. LAWYER, Apr. 2004, at 12
(reprinting O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW, supra annot. 49, at 225-30).
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procedure. 41  Next, Jay analyzes City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. and opines that this case marks Justice O'Connor's
"debut as a defender of abortion regulations" and the introduction of her
"undue burden" standard for the examination of abortion restrictions. Id. at
784-85. Jay further observes that Justice O'Connor was beginning to develop
a view on abortion restrictions that accorded deference to state legislatures, but
he notes that she provided no reasons to explain this deference. In Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,43 Justice O'Connor
"gave a similar rough treatment" to abortion restrictions and, as a result, she
voted to uphold them although the majority of the Court invalidated the
restrictions. Id. at 792-93. Jay continues to trace Justice O'Connor's abortion
jurisprudence by looking closely at her decisions in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,4 4 Hodgson v. Minnesota,45 and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.46 He notes that her views echoed the
pronouncements she made in her confirmation hearings and that the "undue
burden" standard evolved, although the requirements for an undue burden, or
the number of women who "must be deterred before the burden becomes
'undue,"' remained unarticulated. Id. at 794-817. In the conclusion, Jay
describes Justice O'Connor's "conflicting tendencies": where she believes
abortion is repugnant but she is hesitant to step in on behalf of the Supreme
Court to tell legislators how to do their job, considering her commitment to
states' rights. Id. at 825. Jay asserts that "[b]eing to blame for the demise of
Roe would be a tough legacy [for Justice O'Connor] to accept." Id. Moreover,
Jay posits that her western heritage, with its strong history of distrust for
government involvement in personal affairs, may have contributed to Justice
O'Connor's hesitancy to accept government dictates on the forms of medical
care people can receive. Id.
52. Wilson Ray Huhn, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Sandra Day
O'Connor: A Refusal to "Foreclose the Unanticipated," 39 AKRON L. REv.
373 (2006). Written shortly after Justice O'Connor's retirement from the
Supreme Court, this article provides a brief overview of Justice O'Connor's
constitutional jurisprudence, including decisions addressing the Commerce
Clause, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause. Huhn characterizes Justice O'Connor's early years on the
41. Jay explains that as a state legislator, Justice O'Connor voted for "a conscience clause
allowing hospitals, doctors, and other employees to decline to perform abortions," if they had a
conscience-based objection. Jay, supra annot. 51, at 780. She also voted to "[exclude] state
funding for abortions from the state's health plan for low-income women." Id.
42. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
43. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
44. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
45. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
46. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Court as revealing her focus on jurisdiction and appellate review, noting that
she often dismissed cases on technical and procedural grounds. Id. at 375.
Next, he observes her attention to the facts and circumstances of a case, which
fostered her case-by-case analysis. He also discusses her respect for stare
decisis, as evidenced in her refusal to overrule Roe v. Wade.4 7 Finally, Huhn
explores the evolution of Justice O'Connor's constitutional jurisprudence with
respect to fundamental rights.
53. Matthew J. Kita, Comment, Federalism on the High Seas: The Admiralty
Jurisprudence of Sandra Day O'Connor, 18 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 131 (2005).
According to Kita, Justice O'Connor is "one of the most influential and prolific
Justices in the field of admiralty and maritime law," having published seventy
opinions in this area. Id. at 132. Kita discusses the source of Justice
O'Connor's maritime jurisprudence and highlights reactions to her opinions.
Particular attention is paid to Justice O'Connor's treatment of the application
of federal maritime law by state legislatures and courts. Through the analysis
of case law, Kita examines whether Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence serves
the historic goals of a uniform maritime law, separation of powers, and local
and federal needs. Id. at 132, 148-63. Kita reflects that, similar to her
jurisprudence in other areas of the law, Justice O'Connor's admiralty decisions
reflect
[a] concern for providing a just and equitable result in each case[,
which] is evident in her desire to rule narrowly, to eschew bright-line
rules, and to seek a pragmatic outcome of the disputes before her.
Her recognition that the states play an important role in our national
system, and her belief that it is the role of the legislature to make
public policy determinations, has been the foundation of her
jurisprudence during her tenure on the Court. Her decisions in the
maritime law arena have allowed her an opportunity to make
manifest her desire to effectuate all of these ideals.
Id. at 168-69.
54. C. Lincoln Combs, Note, A Curious Choice: Hibbs v. Winn as a Case
Study of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's Balancing Jurisprudence, 37 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 183 (2005). As Combs explains in his introduction, Justice O'Connor
sided with the liberal wing of the Court in Hibbs v. Winn,48 a case dealing with
the Establishment Clause and federalism, issues that have divided the Court
along ideological lines. Id. at 183-84. Yet Justice O'Connor wrote neither a
concurrence nor a dissent, prompting legal scholars to speculate about her
reasoning in the case. Combs uses this case to study Justice O'Connor's
deliberative process and her approach to balancing tests. He concludes that her
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. 542 U.S. 88 (2004).
2008] 1123
Catholic University Law Review
vote in Hibbs demonstrates a balancing of civil rights, stare decisis, and
federalism concerns. Id. at 196-97.
55. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Sandra Day O'Connor's Position on
Discrimination, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 241 (2004).
Gottlieb's essay addresses the evolution of Justice O'Connor's treatment of
discrimination by analyzing her judicial decisions, their doctrinal
underpinnings, and her view of racism. Starting from the premise that the
Court holds de jure and explicit forms of discrimination impermissible,
Gottlieb provides examples of how the "intent test," most frequently employed
by Justice O'Connor in discrimination cases, allows her to ignore the
consequences of discrimination against blacks. Id. at 242-44. Among other
landmark cases, the author discusses Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett,49 Tennessee v. Lane,5" Miller-El v. Cockrell,5 Bowers v.
Hardwick,52 Schlup v. Delo,53 and Romer v. Evans.54 There is a particularly
insightful discussion of Herrera v. Collins,55 where Justice O'Connor
employed the doctrine of federalism in refusing to consider post-conviction
evidence in a capital conviction appeal, resulting in a decision in which
"procedure mattered but innocence did not." Id. at 249. In situating Justice
O'Connor with her conservative colleagues, Gottlieb provides several
thoughtful reasons for the failure of Justice O'Connor, and "so much of white
society," to understand and remedy more subtle forms of discrimination among
black Americans. Id. at 252-56.
56. Diane Lowenthal & Barbara Palmer, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: The
World's Most Powerful Jurist?, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
49. 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
states "to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such
individuals are rational").
50. 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 was a constitutional exercise of Congress' enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect the fundamental right to access the courts).
51. 537 U.S. 322, 348 (2003) (finding that a prisoner seeking habeas relief was entitled to a
certificate of appealability because it was "debatable" whether prosecutors' use of peremptory
strikes against African Americans was the result of purposeful discrimination).
52. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. 513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995) (determining that a less stringent standard of review
governs the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner is sentenced to death and raises a
claim of actual innocence). Justice O'Connor concurred, writing separately to clarify her view of
the Court's holding. Id. at 332-34 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that Colorado's constitutional amendment
prohibiting all protection of homosexuals from discrimination violated the Fourteenth
Amendment).
55. 506 U.S. 390, 426-27 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that a claim of
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence is grounds for federal habeas relief only if
the case if "truly extraordinary").
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CLASS 211 (2004). This article analyzes statistical patterns in Justice
O'Connor's decisions and her influence on the Court's jurisprudence. The
authors conclude that although Justice O'Connor writes the same overall
number of opinions as her colleagues, in "particular subsets of cases,"
including civil rights, five-to-four decisions, and landmark cases, she is
particularly influential. Id. at 212, 226, 238.
57. Masha A. Dabiza, Note, Roper v. Simmons and the Jurisprudence of
Sandra Day O'Connor, 8 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 1 (2004), http://www.boalt.org/
bjcl/v8/v8dabiza.htm. This student Note examines Justice O'Connor's
personal, historical, and judicial background in order to predict her decision in
Roper v. Simmons.56 Dabiza predicts that Justice O'Connor would join the
eventual majority, ruling that the execution of individuals who committed
capital crimes as juveniles constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Dabiza
also sketches the history of juvenile capital punishment.
58. Kenneth Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal
Citizenship, 55 SuP. CT. REv. 357 (2003). Karst examines Justice O'Connor's
opinions in areas where the Court addresses whether the right to equal
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment should be more inclusive. These
areas include discrimination on the basis of sex, race, and sexual orientation,
abortion rights, and religious freedom. Karst conducts an in-depth
examination of decisions dealing with race, religion, and gender roles. In each
of the areas that Karst reviews, he finds that Justice O'Connor struggles with
reaching the goal of inclusion because of "exclusionary pressures of group
status politics." Id. at 358. Karst also explores tensions between Justice
O'Connor's allegiance to state sovereignty and obtaining equal citizenship.
59. Victoria Ashley, Comment, Death Penalty Redux: Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's Role on the Rehnquist Court and the Future of the Death Penalty
in America, 54 BAYLOR L. REv. 407 (2002). In this student Comment, the
author reflects on Justice O'Connor's remarks made in a speech before the
Minnesota Women Lawyers on July 1, 2001, where Justice O'Connor
articulated her unease with the administration of the death penalty in the
United States and suggested adopting minimum standards for lawyers
appointed in capital cases. Id. at 408. Ashley compares Justice O'Connor's
concerns with Justice Blackmun's views that prompted his change of heart and
move to advocate abolition of the death penalty. Ashley further asks whether
56. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of individuals who were less than
eighteen years old at the time they committed a capital crime as a violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments). Justice O'Connor dissented. Id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that neither societal values nor the doctrine of proportionality prohibit the execution of
an individual who committed a capital crime as a juvenile).
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the Supreme Court is shifting toward abolition of the death penalty, and finds
Justice O'Connor's vote on capital cases to be "dispositive." Id at 425.
60. Jean Hoefer Toal, Reply to Professor Tarpley's Comment Regarding
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 54 S.C. L. REV. 267 (2002). Hoefer Toal, the
Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court, characterizes Tarpley's
essay 57 as "an overheated, sensational personal attack masquerading under the
guise of legal scholarship." Id. at 267. Arguing against Tarpley's thesis,
Hoefer Toal states that Justice O'Connor's affirmative action opinions
represent the Supreme Court's struggle "to develop a coherent, effective, and
constitutional approach to remedy past and to prevent future discrimination
based on race and gender." Id. at 271. Hoefer Toal also explains how personal
attacks on judges, particularly Tarpley's attack on Justice O'Connor, have
broader, damaging implications, and threaten judicial independence.
61. Vikram David Amar, Of Hobgoblins and Justice O'Connor's
Jurisprudence of Equality, 32 MCGEORGE L. REv. 823 (2001). This short
essay explores the alleged inconsistencies-a criticism frequently evoked-in
Justice O'Connor's decisions addressing race-based government action. After
explaining the importance of Justice O'Connor's votes in this area, agreeing
that she "holds the fate of constitutional law in her hands," Amar debunks
criticisms that she applies standards inconsistently and in an ad hoc fashion.
Id. at 823-34. He concludes that there is "more consistency and deep
constitutional instinct" in her decisions addressing race than her critics admit.
Id. at 835.
62. Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious
Equality: Justice O'Connor's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 837 (2001). This essay was written
as part of a symposium issue celebrating Justice O'Connor's twentieth year on
the Supreme Court. Brownstein provides a cumulative analysis of O'Connor
decisions on the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, and he
concludes that her doctrinal approach, although conclusory and evolving, "sets
out the parameters of the appropriate relationship between religion and
government in our society." Id. at 838. Brownstein's analysis also discusses
Justice O'Connor's use of a balancing test, where she weighs the right to
religious freedom with the importance of state interests, and explains how her
jurisprudence fits into the development of the religious clauses of the First
Amendment.
57. See Joan Tarpley, A Comment on Justice O'Connor's Quest for Power and Its Impact on
African American Wealth, 53 S.C. L. REV. 117 (2001), infra annot. 65.
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63. Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, A Woman Decides: Justice
O'Connor and Due Process Rights of Choice, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 895
(2001). The authors tell the story of how and why Justice O'Connor's ten-year
critique of Roe v. Wade58 led her to reaffirm the central holding of the case
rather than dismantle it. Id. at 895-96. They posit that
Justice[ O'Connor's] respect for individual choice in matters that
define one's personhood is related to an admirable capacity to
appreciate equally the role of principles or first premises and the role
of context in legal decisionmaking . . . [and] that the capacity to
integrate premise-based and contextual analysis is a strength that
must be developed against the grain of cultural and psycho-social
pressures that are grounded in theories and stereotypes about gender
but inhibit intellectual versatility in both men and women.
Id. at 896. Part I of the article explains the relevance of gender to judicial
decision-making. Part II explores why sound legal reasoning requires avoiding
gender stereotypes that are harmful to women. 59  The final section
demonstrates how Justice O'Connor's understanding of due process has
allowed her to avoid gender stereotypes, but the authors stress that "greater
vigilance" on Justice O'Connor's part is required. Id. at 897.
64. Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Sandra Day O'Connor. A Justice
Who Has Made a Difference in Constitutional Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV.
915 (2001). Also written as part of the symposium looking at twenty years of
Justice O'Connor's constitutional jurisprudence, this article examines the five-
to-four decisions that she has written or joined. Justice O'Connor authored
five-to-four decisions in cases on federalism, due process, equal protection,
affirmative action and reappointment, the Takings Clause, the Eighth
Amendment, and the First Amendment. She joined five-to-four decisions in
cases involving jurisdiction, justiciability, the Commerce Clause, Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment implicating the Commerce Clause, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, fundamental rights provided under the Due Process Clause,
affirmative action, the Takings Clause, and the First Amendment. The authors
also examine cases where the Court was less divided, such as six-to-three
decisions where Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion. Last, the
article looks at Justice O'Connor's dissenting votes and opinions.
65. Joan Tarpley, A Comment on Justice O'Connor's Quest for Power and
Its Impact on African American Wealth, 53 S.C. L. REV. 117 (2001). In this
essay, Tarpley illustrates the ways that Justice O'Connor's affirmative action
opinions, which Tarpley argues are deeply hostile to affirmation action, further
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. Justice O'Connor herself has warned against the harm to women from gender
stereotypes. See O'Connor, Portia's Progress, supra annot. 32, at 1547.
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poverty among African Americans. Tarpley discusses Justice O'Connor's
opinions in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,60 City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.,61 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena62 to demonstrate the
hostile dismantling of affirmative action. The article also explores the
disagreements between Justices O'Connor and Scalia. 63  Justice Scalia's
attacks are important to Tarpley insofar as they reveal Justice O'Connor as a
self-interested and result-oriented politician. Tarpley also examines
affirmative action in the context of the Court and argues that Justice O'Connor
is working to dominate the institution. The final section offers insight into the
economic impact that Justice O'Connor's opinions have had on African
American wealth and the national economy.
66. Judith Olans Brown, Wendy E. Parmet, & Mary E. O'Connell, The
Rugged Feminism of Sandra Day O'Connor, 32 IND. L. REV. 1219 (1999).
The authors provide a compelling and well-supported analysis of Justice
O'Connor's jurisprudence and reasoning in cases involving issues affecting the
lives of women.6 After providing a sketch of Justice O'Connor's biography-
highlighting her upbringing on the Lazy B ranch, exceptional academic record,
strong work ethic, and employment history-the authors argue that in areas of
importance to women, Justice O'Connor's use of contextual, fact-based (as
opposed to rule-based) analysis, and experiential reasoning, led her to decide
cases in ways that resonate with her own "rugged" experiences. The authors
compare Justice O'Connor's opinions dealing with various topics such as
abortion, children, death and dying, the market, the workplace, and the
economy. Concluding that Justice O'Connor's approach is based not only on
her femininity but also on "her Protestantism, her wealth, her western heritage,
her careerism, and her personal courage," the authors define her feminism as
"rugged and self-reliant." Id. at 1246.
67. Jennifer R. Byme, Comment, Toward a Colorblind Constitution: Justice
O'Connor's Narrowing of Affirmative Action, 42 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 619 (1998).
Examining seventeen years of Justice O'Connor's constitutional affirmative
action jurisprudence, Byme argues that Justice O'Connor's moderate approach
as a swing vote has confined her to using affirmative action to remedy past
60. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
61. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
62. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
63. See also JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE
SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 277-96 (2005), infra annot. Il1
(describing the relationship between Justices O'Connor and Scalia).
64. As the authors explain, their analysis is in contrast to examining whether Justice
O'Connor is a "true" feminist, as that question "overemphasizes a particular delineation of
feminist orthodoxy and neglects the nature of her contributions." Brown et al., supra annot. 66, at
1219 (footnote omitted).
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discrimination. Id. at 619-20, 623-24. The result, according to Byrne, is that
the application of affirmative action will be narrowed as "Justice O'Connor's
moderate approach to affirmative action serves as an equitable and reasonable
means of correcting this country's legacy of discrimination while protecting
individual rights." Id. at 620. In discussing Justice O'Connor's role in the
development of affirmative action jurisprudence, Byrne compares Justice
O'Connor's approach with her liberal and conservative colleagues on the
Court, and describes the state of affirmative action before Justice O'Connor
joined the Court.
68. Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline Question,
39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 865 (1998). This article explores the relationship
between majority and dissenting opinions, and specifically asks, "[s]hould a
Justice who disagrees with a majority of the Court nevertheless accept the
majority's holding as defining the law for purposes of establishing a baseline
for subsequent questions?" Id. at 865. Sherry advances three arguments for
answering yes to this question: (1) Justices generally assume that a majority
decision defines the law for purposes of deciding subsequent questions, even if
they disagreed with the majority holding;65 (2) Justices, including O'Connor,
employ strong language to show that the Court's decisions are reflective of the
Court acting as a single institution or unit that determines the law; and (3) in
many instances, it is appropriate for dissenters to consider the majority as the
baseline for future analysis.
69. Elizabeth F. Defeis, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor from an
International Perspective, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 391 (1997). This article
discusses Justice O'Connor's support for the spread of democratic values
throughout the world. As an executive board member of the Central and East
European Law Initiative of the American Bar Association, Justice O'Connor
has traveled throughout Eastern Europe and Asia to promote democratic
values. Id. at 391-92. The author finds parallels in Justice O'Connor's
personal and professional background and the principles that she believes are
essential to democracy. Those principles include an independent judiciary,
65. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Justice O'Connor did not accept the
majority decision from an earlier case in which she had dissented, Employment Div., Dep 't of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), as defining the laws for purposes of deciding the issue
presented in Flores. Flores, 521 U.S. at 544-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Sherry,
supra annot. 68, at 871 ("Justice O'Connor in Flores-without discussing the issue--declined to
use Smith as a baseline, instead judging Congress's Section 5 power against her own, dissenting
view of the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause."). However, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211 (1995), Justice O'Connor accepted the Court's earlier holding in Lampf Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), as establishing the law for
purposes of deciding Plaut, even though she had dissented in Lampf Sherry, supra annot. 68, at
876.
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free and independent press, fundamental and constant civil rights, and civic
participation, engagement, and public responsibility.
70. Sameer M. Ashar & Lisa F. Opoku, Recent Development, Justice
O'Connor's Blind Rationalization of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence-
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), 31 HARV C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 223 (1996). After providing a brief history of federal affirmative
action programs and the evolution of affirmative action jurisprudence, the
authors offer an in-depth analysis of Adarand. The authors further argue that
the decision in this case demonstrates that the Court was incorrect in applying
the standard "of strict scrutiny to all programs involving racial and ethnic
classification without regard to the relative power of the individuals receiving
the benefits or burdens resulting from the classification." Id at 223. Pointing
out that ethnic and racial discrimination persist, the authors demonstrate that
providing the statistical proof required to prove discrimination under Adarand
imposes an expensive administrative burden on the same victims and continues
the favored treatment of the white majority. Id. at 234-40.
71. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character: The Moral
Agendas of Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 219
(1996). This article focuses on the conservative majority of the Court to
determine the "nonprocess values" that appeal to these Justices and how these
values can be understood within the definition of conservatism. Id. at 220.
Gottlieb argues that historically, conservatives have "a set of views about
character." Id. at 221. Further, he asserts that these views have a profound and
fundamental impact on how these Justices decide issues. Id. at 221-22.
Examining the opinions of and differences among Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Scalia on race, abortion, religion, free speech, criminal
procedure, democracy, and federalism, Gottlieb discusses the nexus between
character and conservatism and specifically looks at the ways that each
Justice's understanding of character moves his or her vote.
72. Joel S. Jacobs, Endorsement as "Adoptive Action:" A Suggested
Definition of and Argument for, Justice O'Connor's Establishment Clause
Test, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 29 (1994). Jacobs argues that the endorsement
test, as formulated by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,
66
should be refined through the crafting of a more refined understanding of
"endorsement" based on "adoptive action. ' 67
66. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Jacobs explains the adoptive action standard as follows:
The government unconstitutionally endorses religion when it takes adoptive
religious action. An adoptive religious act is an action that expresses approval or
disapproval of religion in general, a particular religion, or a "distinctively religious"
element of a religion. If approval or disapproval is not explicit, it should nonetheless
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73. Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist
Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891 (1995). The authors evaluate the theory of whether
there is a distinction in the way that female judges decide cases from the way
that male judges decide cases. By comparing the opinions of Justices
O'Connor and Ginsburg in the 1993 Term, the authors conclude that there is
no female jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the authors assert that there should be
more female judges to remedy past discrimination and invigorate the judiciary.
74. Lisa R. Graves, Looking Back, Looking Ahead. Justice O'Connor,
Ideology, and the Advice and Consent Process, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
121 (1993). Graves argues that judicial nominees should be required to
explain viewpoints on federal law and judicial roles in their Senate
confirmation hearings. Id. at 125. To this end, the first part of the article looks
at Justice O'Connor's refusal to explain her views highlighting specific
statements she made at her confirmation hearing, especially her refusal to
explain her approach to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the rights
of criminal defendants. The second part examines her jurisprudence on those
two issues. The third part connects the first and second parts by showing how
Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence supports several theoretical positions for a
full Senate investigation of judicial nominees and a discussion of the
nominees' ideological views. Moreover, Graves asserts that nominees should
be rejected on the basis of ideological views.
75. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Essay, An Open Letter From One Black
Scholar to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Or, How Not to Become Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 21 (1994). The author
addresses Justice Ginsburg in an open letter critical of Justice O'Connor's
discourse and jurisprudence on race, noting that she has been "particularly
dismissive of the concerns of black people" and supportive of the racial status
quo. Id. at 23, 32-34.
76. Jennifer E. Spreng, Comment, Failing Honorably: Balancing Tests,
Justice O'Connor and Free Exercise of Religion, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 837
(1994). This Comment asserts that although Justice O'Connor applies the
compelling interest standard to issues involving the free exercise of religion, an
examination of her free exercise jurisprudence reveals her deference to
governmental agencies and state decisions, demonstrating that she instead
employs the rational review standard. Rational review, according to Spreng,
be inferred when a special benefit or burden has been assigned to religion in general, a
particular religion, or a distinctively religious element of a religion, unless it seems
likely that the benefit or burden was assigned pursuant to purely secular criteria that are
not a "sham." Courts considering Establishment Clause challenges confront a wide
variety of situations, and the test should be consistent when applied to all of them.
Jacobs, supra annot. 72, at 42.
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permits as constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause68 onerous and
significant burdens on free exercise to those followers of non-traditional or
"countercultural religions." Id. at 839.
77. David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The
Emerging Dispute Between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over
Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 895 (1993). In this
student Note, the underlying question is whether Justice O'Connor's decision
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,69 where she
upheld the right to an abortion as a fundamental right, marked a change in her
view of unenumerated fundamental rights so as to distinguish her from other
conservatives on the Court, particularly Justice Scalia. To explore this issue,
Anders examines and compares the theoretical underpinnings of Justices Scalia
and O'Connor regarding unenumerated fundamental rights derived from the
Due Process Clause.
78. Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the
Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1992). Karst looks
at the renewed effort of political groups to obtain government funding for
religious purposes in this article. More specifically, he examines the political
efforts of such groups to obtain government funding and sponsorship for
official exhibitions with religious symbolism. He notes that when state and
local governments permit such displays, members of religious minorities suffer
a loss of status. In his analysis, he argues that Justice O'Connor's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence serves to provide "doctrinal recognition to
this harm" by focusing on the issue of whether the governmental action has
endorsed or disapproved of religion. Id. at 504-05.
79. Alfred W. Blurmrosen, Society in Transition III.- Justice O'Connor and
the Destabilization of the Griggs Principle of Employment Discrimination, 13
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 53 (1991).7" Blumrosen discusses the tension in Justice
O'Connor's employment discrimination jurisprudence before the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. He argues that Justice O'Connor was cognizant
that the conservatives on the Court employed a narrow view that continued the
subordination she herself once faced seeking employment as a woman. Yet,
Blumrosen further argues that she is resistant to endorse sex- or race-based
affirmative action in the face of employment discrimination as evidenced by
68. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
69. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
70. This article is a companion to other papers by this author: Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society
in Transition I: A Broader Congressional Agenda for Equal Employment-The Peace Dividend,
Leapfrogging, and Other Matters, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 257 (1990); and Alfred W.
Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price Waterhouse and the Individual Employment
Discrimination Case, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023 (1990).
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her adherence to the principle established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 71
which held that discriminatory employment practices are illegal unless justified
by an otherwise nondiscriminatory business necessity.
72
80. Marci A. Hamilton, Justice O'Connor's Intellectual Property Opinions:
Currents and Crosscurrents, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 71 (1991). 71 On
O'Connor's tenth year as a Supreme Court Justice, Hamilton observes that
Justice O'Connor is "a force in the intellectual property area, especially the
copyright arena," having authored major copyright decisions. Id. at 71.
Hamilton compares Justice O'Connor's decision in Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises74 with her decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co.,75 and discusses the tension in Justice O'Connor's
reasoning in these two copyright cases. Similarly, Hamilton compares Feist
with Justice O'Connor's decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 76 a patent decision. Accordingly, these opinions offer great insight into
the functioning of the Court as well as Justice O'Connor's attitudes about
intellectual property.
81. Twila L. Perry, Justice O'Connor and Children and the Law, 13
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 81 (1991). Perry provides a thoughtful and well-
reasoned discussion of Justice O'Connor's view about children through
analyzing her votes and written opinions in cases involving the parent-child
relationship, students' rights, protections from physical and sexual abuse, and
juvenile justice. Finding that Justice O'Connor takes a conservative
approach-similar to her male counterparts on the Court--deferring to states
and upholding a traditional view of the family while employing a fact-specific
analysis, the author also questions the relevance of Justice O'Connor's gender
in examining her jurisprudence involving children. Id. at 91-92. Perry
concludes that the special, unique, and important interests of children are given
short shrift by Justice O'Connor's generally conservative approach. Id. at 92.
71. 401 U.S. 424(1971).
72. Id. at 436.
73. Also published as Marci A. Hamilton, Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: An Uncommon Though Characteristic
Approach, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 83 (1990).
74. 471 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1985) (holding that unauthorized quotations by a magazine from
a soon-to-be published memoir did not constitute fair use within the Copyright Revision Act of
1976 because publication by the magazine effectively eliminated the copyright holder's fight to
first publication).
75. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that copyright protection does not extend to the logical
organization of facts in the white pages of a telephone book).
76. 489 U.S. 141, 167-68 (1989) (holding that a state statute regulating intellectual property
is preempted by the Supremacy Clause).
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82. Rocco Potenza, Comment, Affirmative Action: Will Justice O'Connor
Author Its End?, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 805 (1991). In Potenza's introduction, he
outlines the position of the Court on affirmative action during the 1980s, which
he characterizes as sharply divided.77 Similarly, in cases decided in 1989 and
1990, City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, he points out that the Court applied different standards. 78  This
background informs Potenza's analysis, which examines Justice O'Connor's
views on the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action and the impact
of such jurisprudence on the future of affirmative action programs.
83. Annamay T. Sheppard, The Family Law Jurisprudence of Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 155 (1991). In this speech
transcript, Sheppard briefly discusses Justice O'Connor's family law decisions
to understand the Justice's views on family rights. Sheppard concludes that
Justice O'Connor believes that individuals and not the government are
responsible for the survival and stability of the family. Moreover, Sheppard
finds, Justice O'Connor's decisions are deferential to state courts' efforts to
deal with family matters, but the Justice also seems to believe that any
governmental effort to strengthen families is the product of "public largesse"
and not constitutionally required. Id. at 157.
84. Alfred Slocum, At the Crossroads of Civil Rights: Tension Between the
Wartime Amendments in the Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, 13 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 105 (1991). Slocum's article is premised on the view that Justice
O'Connor's vision of equal protection is race neutral and color blind.
According to Slocum, this view creates an "uneasy tension" with the
Thirteenth Amendment's requirement of "color consciousness to eliminate the
badges and indicia of slavery." Id. at 105. Slocum's analysis compares the
different approaches to resolving race-based issues employed by Justices
O'Connor and Marshall.
77. In 1989 in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court reached
its first majority decision in an affirmative action case since the 1978 decision of Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Before Croson, the Court was split. See
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (plurality) (invalidating the school
board's layoff provision protecting employees on the basis of race); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 454, 492 (1980) (upholding the "minority business enterprise" provision of the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977, which required that at least ten percent of each grant made
under the Act be dedicated to obtaining services or supplies from minority business enterprises);
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (invalidating the special admissions program).
78. Compare Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (applying strict scrutiny review to raced-based
affirmative action programs and invalidating the programs), with Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 564-66 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding the affirmative action
program).
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85. Barbara Palmer, Note, Feminist Or Foe? Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
Title VII Sex-Discrimination, and Support for Women's Rights, 13 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 159 (1991). Palmer provides a substantive analysis of eight
landmark cases addressing women's rights in the context of sexual
discrimination suits to determine whether Justice O'Connor's thinking and
voting record on this issue is "sufficiently feminist." Id. at 160. Palmer
evaluates two categories of cases. First, she evaluates the decisions in sex
discrimination cases filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,79 in
the employment context: Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 8 1 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,8 and Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins. Next, Palmer looks at pregnancy discrimination claims, also raised
under Title VII: Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
84
California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra,85 and Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.86 Beginning with the premise articulated in Beverly
Cook's 1978 study that women judges are more sympathetic to the civil rights
of women, Palmer predicts that Justice O'Connor would be similarly
sympathetic--even feminist-regarding women's rights. Id. at 160-61. The
substantive analysis reveals otherwise and illustrates that although Justice
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Section 2000e-2(a) provides that it shall be unlawful
for an employer to refuse to hire, fire, or "otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
80. 463 U.S. 1073, 1074 (1983) (holding that offering retirement benefits from companies
that pay a woman less benefits than a man who has made the same contribution constitutes sex
discrimination under Title VII). Justice O'Connor concurred, stating that she agreed with Justice
Powell's dissent that the decision should be prospective rather than retrospective. Id. at 1109
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
81. 467 U.S. 69, 74-76 (1984) (finding that an employment benefit that is not part of an
express or implied contract may not be administered in a discriminatory fashion, and any term,
condition, or privilege of employment may not be based on factors prohibited by Title VII).
82. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (holding that a hostile work environment is a form of sex
discrimination actionable under Title VII).
83. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) ("[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of
liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs gender into account."). Justice O'Connor wrote
separately to explain why the facts of the case warranted departure from the standard established
by prior case law, and when the burden of persuasion should be shifted to the employer. Id. at
261-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
84. 462 U.S. 669, 675-76 (1983) (holding that providing female employees with more
extensive pregnancy benefits than men discriminates against male employees in violation of Title
VII).
85. 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (holding that Title VII did not preempt a state statute favoring
pregnant women with respect to pregnancy disability leave because the statute did not require
employers to violate Title VII).
86. 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (holding that the exclusion of all female employees, except
those with documented infertility, from certain jobs constituted facial discrimination under Title
VII).
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O'Connor often votes in favor of women or in favor of a broad interpretation
of Title VII, her language and votes often support anti-feminist positions,
which reinforce stereotypes ultimately harmful to women.
86. Nadine Taub, Sandra Day O'Connor and Women's Rights, 13 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 113 (1991). Examining Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence in the
area of women's rights, Taub asserts that Justice O'Connor's contribution
toward gender equality is "plainly mixed." Id. at 113. The author discusses
Justice O'Connor's approach as "[a] forward and back 'two-step' where
Justice O'Connor strikes down obvious discrimination based on sex, yet
reinforces less obvious sexual stereotypes and archaic notions of the roles of
men and women. Id. In supporting her thesis, Taub examines Mississippi87
University for Women v. Hogan and notes that in this case Justice O'Connor
moved forward by rejecting a single-sex admission policy, which was founded
on gender stereotypes. Id. at 113-14. Taub then argues that in several other
cases, including Lehr v. Robertson,88 Arizona Governing Committee v.
Norris,8 9 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,90 Michael H. v. Gerald D.,91 and
Bowers v. Hardwick,92 that Justice O'Connor's decisions undermine gender
equality.
93
87. Dorothy E. Roberts, Sandra Day O'Connor, Conservative Discourse,
and Reproductive Freedom, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 95 (1991). Roberts
constructs her analysis and understanding of Justice O'Connor's abortion
jurisprudence around four issues: (1) whether the Constitution provides a
87. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
88. 463 U.S. 248, 264-65 (1983) (concluding that failure to provide notice of adoption to a
putative father who had not established a substantial relationship with his child did not violate his
due process rights).
89. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
90. 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (determining that subjective or discretionary employment
actions challenged under Title VII must be evaluated using a disparate impact analysis).
91. 491 U.S. 110, 119, 129-30 (1989) (a California statute that presumed a child born to a
cohabiting married couple to be a child of the marriage did not violate the biological father's due
process rights). Justice O'Connor concurred in part, disagreeing with a footnote in the majority
opinion that "sketche[d] a mode of historical analysis" she found inconsistent with past decisions.
Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Similarly, Justice O'Connor has discussed some of
the pitfalls of historical analysis. See O'Connor, Keynote Address-Conference on Compelling
Government Interests, supra annot. 18, at 541-42.
92. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Justice O'Connor joined the majority in holding that criminalizing
homosexual sodomy was not a violation of substantive due process. See id. at 189.
93. In Bowers, Justice O'Connor "joined the Court in rejecting the concept of moral
autonomy ... where consenting adults are not affected or harmed by the behavior." Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Sandra Day O'Connor's Position on Discrimination, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 241, 247 (2004). Gottlieb further notes this "rejection of moral autonomy also
frees Court conservatives to fill that gap with their own conceptions of proper behavior, including
their views on discrimination." Id. at 247-48.
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fundamental right to abortion; (2) when does the govemment infringe on that
right; (3) what constitutes a compelling government interest justifying
infringement of the right to abortion; and (4) what does reproductive freedom
mean under the Constitution and how should the federal courts be involved in
protective reproductive freedom? Id. at 95-96. Contrasting Justice
O'Connor's reasoning to that of Justice Scalia's, Roberts argues that Justice
O'Connor's jurisprudence constitutes "a veiled articulation of a conservative
political perspective that is in fact a bolder judicial defense of the current
distribution of wealth and power." Id. at 96. In the analysis that follows,
Roberts demonstrates how the "neutral and moderate" judicial rationales and
standards constructed by Justice O'Connor, such as the undue burden standard,
allow her to uphold Roe v. Wade94 while permitting government intrusion most
harmful to poor and oppressed women. 9 Id. at 98. In other words, Roberts
shows how, unlike most of her conservative counterparts on the Court, Justice
O'Connor examines the real impact of the law on society, albeit with a
conservative eye. Id. at 103.
88. George C. Thomas III, Justice O'Connor's Pragmatic View of Coerced
Self-Incrimination, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 117 (1991). The author
premises his argument on the "puzzle" of the Self-Incrimination Clause, which
is devoid of meaning because the concept of coercion "has no meaning apart
from the consensus that already exists in a particular society at a particular
time about what coercion means." Id. at 117. Thomas argues that Justice
O'Connor's jurisprudence provides "a pragmatic solution to this puzzle." Id.
After tracing the history of the concept of coerced self-incrimination, Thomas
analyzes Justice O'Connor's decisions and votes on Miranda issues.
Concluding that Justice O'Connor's pragmatism is both "coherent and
plausible," as well as "clear and (reasonably) easy to apply," Thomas states
that it can result in a "subtle erosion of the Self-incrimination Clause." Id. at
94. 410U.S. 113(1973).
95. For instance, Roberts discusses the government action/inaction rationale to describe the
impact of Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490 (1989):
The government action/inaction rationale is just as manipulable as the judicial
deference doctrine. Justice O'Connor's view that the government's funding policy
imposes no obstacle to reproductive choice ignores its real life effects on poor women.
By funding childbirth and not abortion, the government has in fact determined the
choices of women who cannot afford either option. O'Connor's restrictive concept of
liberty is ultimately inadequate to protect the dignity and autonomy of poor women and
women of color. It stands in opposition to a progressive understanding of reproductive
freedom that recognizes the government's affirmative duty to facilitate the processes of
choice and self-determination otherwise precluded by the race, gender, and class
inequalities that permeate our society.
Roberts, supra annot. 87, at 103.
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126-27. Nevertheless, Thomas finds that Justice O'Connor's approach
supports the basic principle of Miranda. Id. at 127.
89. Stephen J. Wermiel, O'Connor: A Dual Role-An Introduction, 13
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129 (1991). Written on Justice O'Connor's ten-year
anniversary on the Supreme Court Bench, Wermiel posits two factors that
distinguish her as a jurist: (1) her role as the first woman on the court and, as
such, her views on abortion, and (2) her role as an independent conservative,
affecting the Court by being the swing vote. In order to examine and fully
appreciate these roles, Wermiel analyzes Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence on
sex discrimination, abortion, religious freedom, capital punishment, and
federalism.
90. Thomas R. Haggard, Mugwump, Mediator, Machiavellian, or Majority?
The Role of Justice O'Connor in the Affirmative Action Cases, 24 AKRON L.
REV. 47 (1990). During Justice O'Connor's first ten years on the Court, there
were ten affirmative action cases generating forty separate opinions. Id. at 47.
Haggard observes that Justice O'Connor's decisions in these cases were
generally criticized for the following: failing to be on either side of the
ideological debate (or in Haggard's terms, being an "intellectual
'mugwump'"); taking a moderate view on issues in hopes that the Court would
come to agreement; and offering only "lip service" to methods of remedying
discrimination. Id. at 49. Haggard examines Justice O'Connor's affirmative
action decisions and argues that although these criticisms are justified, her
opinions reflect "a more favorable image" of affirmative action. Id.
91. M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan, Federalism and Separation of
Powers on a "Conservative" Court: Currents and Cross-Currents from
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1443 (1990). This essay
analyzes the different approaches to federalism employed by Justices
O'Connor and Scalia. The authors believe that, although these differences are
often subtle, they are nevertheless significant. Id. at 1443. The article
compares the Justices' approaches to separation of powers-Justice Scalia
takes a formal, as opposed to functional, approach, whereas Justice O'Connor
is more protective of state and local government decisions. These differences
are explained by the Justices' backgrounds and general methods of
constitutional interpretation, with Justice Scalia employing a strict, rule-bound
interpretation, and Justice O'Connor employing a more flexible constitutional
interpretation that considers an issue's context.
92. Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for
An Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1989). This article was written
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shortly after Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,96 where Justice
O'Connor, through her concurring opinion, upheld Missouri's abortion
restrictions but declined to review the constitutionality of Roe v. Wade.97 The
authors explain, specifically with Justice O'Connor as their intended audience,
why she should "stand up to those who are turning their backs on women," as
legislators and the political process are "not to be trusted" to safeguard these
rights. Id. at 123, 150-55. First, Estrich and Sullivan review the issue of
whether there is a fundamental right to abortion. Next, the authors examine
government infringement on the right to abortion and the level of constitutional
scrutiny required, the questions most relevant following Webster.
93. Susan M. Halatyn, Comment, Sandra Day O'Connor, Abortion, and
Compromise for the Court, 5 TOURo L. REV. 327 (1989). In this student
Comment, Halatyn analyzes Justice O'Connor's dissent in City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,98 specifically discussing the
standard that Justice O'Connor was proposing. Examining the underpinnings
of the decision, Halatyn argues the decision was the product of Justice
O'Connor's commitment to judicial restraint, federalism, and bright-line tests,
rather than a moral repulsion to abortion.
94. Benjamin D. Feder, And a Child Shall Lead Them: Justice O'Connor,
The Principle of Religious Liberty and Its Practical Application, 8 PACE L.
REV. 249 (1988). The underlying premise of this article is that the legal
analysis of issues implicating religion requires a methodology that balances
various values. Further, Feder asserts that the Court has failed to articulate
such a methodology. Yet Justice O'Connor's approach to Establishment
Clause issues, the endorsement or disapproval test, serves as a basis for the
development of a framework that the Court should employ in subsequent
cases.
95. George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U.
ILL. L. REV. 827. Thomas's article sets forth "a single, unifying theory of
double jeopardy" so as to identify a "'core' double jeopardy interest." Id at
828. He critiques the Court's derivative double jeopardy protections as
presented in decisions by Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
96. Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses,
Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 151 (1987). Beschle argues that the Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence is fundamentally flawed because the principle
96. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
97. See id. at 523, 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
98. 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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underlying these clauses, the separation of church and state, is both
"impossible" to achieve and "an unrealistic goal." Id. at 151. Beschle
provides an alternative for First Amendment jurisprudence, liberal neutrality,
which is rooted in classic liberalism. He believes that Justice O'Connor's
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence represents "the
most direct endorsement . . . of liberal neutrality." Id. at 151-52. Justice
O'Connor's version of liberal neutrality attempts to discern "whether
government was, by the practice in question, 'conveying or attempting to
convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred."' Id. at 174. Likewise, it does not require separation of church and
state, but looks to determine whether benefits or burdens are understood as
"messages of favoritism violating the standard of neutrality." Id. Beschle's
analysis describes Justice O'Connor's approach, traces the development of the
religious clause jurisprudence, and applies liberal neutrality to specific First
Amendment problems such as prayer in public school, religious symbols, and
tax exemptions.
97. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). Sherry argues that Justice
O'Connor's approach to constitutional cases is the result of her "feminine
jurisprudence" or application of a "feminine paradigm." Id. at 543-44. Sherry
tests and explores this theory by comparing Justice O'Connor's decisions with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's decisions in Establishment Clause and
discrimination cases. The Justices are otherwise similar and any distinctions,
Sherry argues, must therefore be meaningful. Sherry finds that gender-based
jurisprudence is reflected in Justice O'Connor's use of individualized decision-
making, as opposed to bright-line rules and tests, but Sherry notes that Justice
O'Connor's decisions on criminal procedural matters represent an exception.
98. Edward V. Heck & Paula C. Arledge, Justice O'Connor and the First
Amendment 1981-84, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 993 (1986). Heck and Arledge,
political science professors, analyze Justice O'Connor's approach to free
speech in her first three terms. They argue that Justice O'Connor's
jurisprudence is informed by her experience as a lawyer, state legislator, and
state court judge and "reflect[s] a coherent theory of constitutional
interpretation broadly consistent with Alexander Meiklejohn's view that the
primary purpose of the First Amendment is the protection of 'political
speech."' Id. at 995. Nevertheless, at her confirmation, there was a dearth of
specific indicators to predict how Justice O'Connor would rule on First
Amendment issues once on the Supreme Court. Id. at 1002. The authors
found that Justice O'Connor's Republican Party affiliation proved to be one of
the most reliable indicators in discerning how she would rule, and they provide
tables of Supreme Court voting patterns from 1981-1984. Id. at 1005-07.
Indeed, the authors found that she was more conservative on First Amendment
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issues and analyzed her votes and decisions on political speech and freedom of
the press and association to provide a theoretical framework for understanding
Justice O'Connor's views.
99. Arnold H. Loewy, Essay, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards
Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential Of Justice
O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986). The author's underlying
thesis is that the prohibition on any government action that advances or inhibits
religion "is thoroughly consistent with our constitutional heritage but that its
serious implementation will require rethinking some of our most firmly
entrenched practices." Id. at 1051. This rethinking is reflected in Justice
O'Connor's "endorsement or disapproval" test as articulated in her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.99 The author then applies the test proposed
by Justice O'Connor to historic Supreme Court cases on the Establishment
Clause and generally accepted societal practices reflecting the same issues,
including prayer in public schools, and the invocation of "God" during the
Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag and at the Court's opening ceremonies.
100. Barbara Olson Bruckmann, Note, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor:
Trends Toward Judicial Restraint, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1185 (1985). In
this student note, Olson Bruckmann explores the extent to which judicial
restraint has influenced Justice O'Connor's opinions. Accordingly, Justice
O'Connor's judicial restraint is reflected in her view of the federal judiciary as
limited by constitutional powers, duties delegated to Congress and the
Executive Branch, self-imposed restrictions, and federalism.' Id. at 1186.
Olson Bruckmann argues that the trend in Justice O'Connor's opinions reflect
her belief and commitment to the doctrines of separation of powers and
federalism. Id.
101. Margaret A. Miller, Comment, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Token
or Triumph from a Feminist Perspective, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 493
(1985). This student Comment addresses the question of whether Justice
O'Connor's record on issues affecting women served to disappoint or fulfill
feminist expectations regarding her appointment. Providing a sketch of
feminist concerns at the time of Justice O'Connor's confirmation, Miller
argues that Justice O'Connor did not initially disappoint; she even provided
feminist observers with some encouragement. Id. at 501-02. Miller then
examines Justice O'Connor's decisions in the areas of rights for illegitimate
children, gender discrimination in education and employment benefits, and
99. 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Bruckmann's article mentions Justice O'Connor's article, Trends in the Relationship
Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, supra annot.
26. Bruckmann, supra annot. 100, at 1185 n.2.
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
abortion. Nevertheless, Miller asserts that Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence in
abortion cases, reflected in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc.10 1 and the companion cases Planned Parenthood Association v.
Ashcroft'0 2 and Simopoulos v. Virginia,103 represented a "severe blow" and
disappointment to feminists. Id. at 522.
102. Grover Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at
Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913
(1983). Using Justice O'Connor's Senate confirmation hearings as a platform
for his discussion of the judicial selection process, Rees explores four main
issues. First, Rees explores whether "judicial selectors" should consider the
opinions and views held by potential judges. Id. at 928. Next, Rees explores
whether senators should employ different standards than presidents in
determining whether to confirm a prospective Justice. The final analysis
explores whether a statement made by a potential Supreme Court Justice at her
confirmation hearings regarding a certain issue would require her to disqualify
herself from deciding cases raising that issue.
103. Robert E. Riggs, Justice O'Connor: A First Term Appraisal, 1983
BYU L. REV. 1. Marking the first Term of Justice O'Connor's twenty-four
years on the Court, Riggs examines whether Justice O'Connor fulfilled
expectations regarding "her judicial competence, her concept of the judicial
role, and her substantive biases." Id. at 2. Riggs provides a statistical synopsis
of Justice O'Connor's first Term voting record, and analyzes her decisions on
cases involving criminal justice, federal power and jurisdiction, and civil
liberties. Accordingly, and based on the foregoing first Term case analysis,
Riggs argues that state authority within the federal system is a persistent value
in Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence.
104. Charles D. Kelso, Justice O'Connor Replaces Justice Stewart: What
Effect on Constitutional Cases?, 13 PAC. L.J. 259 (1982). Kelso utilizes two
approaches for determining Justice O'Connor's impact on the Court as Justice
Stewart's replacement. The first approach involves examining Justice
Stewart's last Term on the Court, from 1980-1981, for voting patterns in five-
to-four decisions. The second approach involves looking at five-to-four
decisions where Justice Stewart provided the fifth and crucial vote for the
majority. The article provides helpful charts and tables that break down how
the Justices on the Burger Court voted in constitutional cases. Noting that
"Justice Stewart was not always found in the conservative or liberal camp,"
Kelso reasons that, assuming Justice O'Connor will vote with the conservative
101. 462U.S. 416(1983).
102. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
103. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
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bloc, her position on the Court should not change many of its decisions. Id. at
266-70. As for the area of affirmative action-a closely decided matter for the
Burger Courtl° 4-Kelso correctly predicted that Justice O'Connor's approach
"may make a real difference in whether the Court approves state of federal
programs of affirmative action." Id. at 270.
105. Carl R. Schenker, Jr., "Reading" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 31
CATH. U. L. REV. 487 (1982). Written shortly after Justice O'Connor joined
the Supreme Court bench, and as part of a symposium on state and local
government issues before the Supreme Court, this article examines Justice
O'Connor's decisions regarding the same as a state court judge. In addition,
the article looks at her early Supreme Court votes and decisions on state and
municipal government issues.
B. Scholarly Monographs and Book Chapters About Justice O'Connor
106. ROBERT W. VAN SICKEL, NOT A PARTICULARLY DIFFERENT VOICE:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR (1998). In the Introduction,
the author notes that several commentators describe Justice O'Connor as a
"moderate" voice on the Supreme Court. Id. at 2. However, he also observes
that "[w]hether this moderation might not simply demonstrate a shifting of the
Court's ostensible ideological center, or whether O'Connor's supposed shift is
merely indicative of the substantive types of cases which the Court has chosen
to hear in recent terms, are questions which have received much less
attention." 10 5 Id. at 2-3. Van Sickel posits that since Justice O'Connor joined
the Supreme Court in 1981, her opinions and votes in cases have been "broadly
consistent with the Reagan Administration's policy agenda." Id. at 3.
The study sets out to answer four related questions about Justice O'Connor:
(1) whether there is an "overarching normative legal philosophy which 'drives'
O'Connor's behavior and thinking on the bench"; (2) whether any "'formal'
theories of judicial behavior"'10 6 contribute to "understanding O'Connor's
approach to adjudication"; (3) whether Justice O'Connor views have evolved;
and (4) whether "Justice O'Connor 'fits' into the Supreme Court of the last
fifteen years." Id. at 4-5. To answer these questions, Van Sickel synthesizes
104. Kelso explains that in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), Justice Stewart found that Congress did not intend to permit race to be considered as a
factor in employment determinations. Kelso, supra annot. 104, at 270. Likewise, Kelso writes
that in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), Justice Stewart argued "in dissent that
affirmative action denies equal protection because the Constitution is color blind." Kelso, supra
annot. 104, at 270.
105. Van Sickel opines that although the number of signed opinions has declined in the last
fifteen years, "the Court's overall agenda has changed little in public policy terms." Van Sickel,
supra annot. 106, at 3 n.8.
106. Formal theories of judicial behavior include the role of the judge's background or
political ideology in their jurisprudence; for Justice O'Connor, this includes her "'local'
professional experience" and western ideology. Van Sickel, supra annot. 106, at 2, 21-22.
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cases (particularly those decided in Justice O'Connor's first decade on the
Court), examines other substantive materials written about Justice O'Connor,
and examines her legislative voting record and opinions drafted on the
Maricopa County Superior Court and Arizona Court of Appeals. Id at 15, 44.
Van Sickel concludes the Introduction by stating that "Justice O'Connor
consistently exhibits . . . a 'marginalist' approach to legal and political
questions." Id. at 5. Her adjudication is within the context of "an essentially
conservative political ideology." Id. Each chapter begins with an interesting
and introspective quotation from Justice O'Connor. See, e.g., id at 1, 13, 43,
73, 111, 161. The work also includes a thorough bibliography. Id. at 181-95.
107. ROBERT ZELNICK, SWING DANCE: JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND THE
MICHIGAN MUDDLE (2004). The author begins by charting Justice O'Connor's
abortion decisions, finding that her jurisprudence on abortion developed in a
similar fashion to her jurisprudence on race. Id. at 5-6. In addition, the author
examines the history of affirmation action and the leading Supreme Court
cases preceding Justice O'Connor's appointment.' 0 7 Next, the author examines
the Justice's employment discrimination cases that show her early approach to
dealing with the issue of race discrimination. Id. at 30. Zelnick observes that
in these early cases, Justice O'Connor distinguished her approach from the
"result-oriented activism" of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall by
consistently applying strict scrutiny: compelling state interest and narrow
tailoring. Id. at 45. Zelnick describes the three types of affirmative action
cases that came before the Court during those years, and discusses Justice
O'Connor's approach in these cases. 10 8 Id.
Zelnick thoroughly discusses the history of affirmative action and provides a
critical review of percentage plans in a historical context, with an in-depth look
at the experiences in Texas, California, and Florida. Id. at 67-92. As the title
of the book suggests, the text provides a detailed analysis of the University of
Michigan affirmative action cases, which includes a discussion of the school's
affirmative action programs, the development of the cases, the legal teams for
both sides, and the methodology and litigation strategy. Id. at 93-118. The
author provides excerpts and analysis from oral argument, with particular
107. Those cases include Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980). See Zelnick, supra annot. 107, at 12-25.
108. The first type of affirmative action case identified are those where a private contract or
consent decree includes a racial preference, such as Weber, 443 U.S. 193. Zelnick, supra annot.
107, at 45. The second type involve government programs that provide African Americans
special benefits in specified areas in order to integrate the economic sector. Id. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, and Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448, are two examples. Zelnick, supra annot. 107, at 12-25. The
third type of case has to do with judicially imposed remedies for past acts of unlawful
discrimination and includes Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), and United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). Zelnick, supra
annot. 107, at 45-46.
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attention paid to Justice O'Connor's questions and the legal counsel's
responses. Id. at 140-41. While discussing all aspects of the case, the author
pays particular attention to Justice O'Connor's analysis and opines that by
approving the law school's admission policy in Grutter v. Bollinger,10 9 she
"found her way back to the position of society's elites ... displayed unusual
obedience to the whims of big education and it's myriad allies." Id. at 167.
The author concludes with a broader discussion of race and education.
108. ELIZABETH VRATO, THE COUNSELORS: CONVERSATIONS WITH 18
COURAGEOUS WOMEN WHO HAVE CHANGED THE WORLD (2002). Vrato
discusses the women's suffrage movement, quoting a statement by Justice
O'Connor regarding Abigail Adams: "In 1776, Abigail Adams-the wife of
future President John Adams-implored her husband, 'Remember the Ladies!'
in drafting this nation's new charter." Id. at 59. Vrato continues by discussing
the Seneca Falls Conference and the New Women's Movement. She discusses
the hurdles that professional women face and recounts Justice O'Connor's
inability to find employment with a law firm because of her gender. The book
also includes a chapter about Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Id. at 173-88. In that
chapter, Justice Ginsburg reflects that Justice O'Connor was "like a big sister,"
despite their jurisprudential differences. Id. at 184.
109. Beverly B. Cook, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Transition to a
Republican Court Agenda, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL
PROFILES 238 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991). Focusing
on the years that Justice O'Connor sat as a member of the Burger Court from
1981-1986, Cook evaluates Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence using three
frameworks: (1) the Justice's judicial agenda; (2) President Ronald Reagan's
agenda for the Court; and (3) the Court's own agenda. Cook highlights that
both Republican and Democratic values are reflected in Justice O'Connor's
decisions. Cook examines the Republican Party values in Justice O'Connor's
opinions by looking at her contribution to federalism, substantive law and
order-including access to the courts, Miranda requirements, right to counsel,
double jeopardy, and capital punishment-the separation of church and state,
property rights, and judicial restraint. Similarly, she examines the Democratic
Party values in Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence on freedom of speech, press
and religion, individual autonomy, equality, affirmative action and racial
equality. Cook concludes by observing that Justice O'Connor's opinions
demonstrate "a willingness to examine case facts carefully and to eschew blind
ideological voting." Id. at 271. Cook's essay also includes a short
109. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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biographical section that provides several astute observations about the
influence of Justice O'Connor's background on her jurisprudence. 1
110. NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON
THE SUPREME COURT (1996). Maveety observes that, at the time this book was
written, analysis about Justice O'Connor focused on her "famous firsts." Id. at
ix. In this work, Maveety aims to provide a more balanced view of Justice
O'Connor, revealing the Justice to be "a key strategist shaping the collective
outputs of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts." Id. Specifically, Maveety
discusses Justice O'Connor's contributions to the development of
constitutional law, and Maveety observes and explores three aspects of her
jurisprudence in this work. They include her "fact-based decision-making
accurately described as contextual conservatism[,] . . . her coalitional
predilections ... to join the winning side of a 5-4 majority on the Court," and
her use of "concurring opinions to shape the development of legal doctrine."
Id. at 4. Maveety's chapters focus on Justice O'Connor's personal and
professional background, her judicial record, and specific constitutional issues.
Id. at 5.
C. Biographical Works
111. JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON
THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE (2005).
Although Justice O'Connor would not meet with Biskupic for this book,
Biskupic relied on a wide range of sources for this substantial biography,
including Justice O'Connor's Supreme Court colleagues, family members, and
former colleagues. Id. at 343. The biography weaves the stories of Justice
O'Connor's personal and professional experiences and includes extensive
discussions about her landmark cases and her jurisprudence as it shaped the
areas of race discrimination, religion, and abortion, among others. See, e.g., id.
at 146-51, 282-86, 319-22. Biskupic also reflects on Justice O'Connor's
nomination and confirmation to the Supreme Court as well as relationships
with each of her Supreme Court brethren. Id. at 73-98, 159. Biskupic's work
includes endnotes to numerous sources, including the Day family archival
materials and papers of former Supreme Court Justices, upon which she relies
for her analysis. E.g., id. at 346, 358.
112. ANN CAREY MCFEATTERS, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: JUSTICE IN THE
BALANCE (2005). Written as a work in the Women's Biography Series,
110. Cook opines that Justice O'Connor "never held the kind of prestigious private and
public law jobs that have prepared male lawyers for federal appellate judgeships, but she learned
to appreciate the law work done at the state and local level." Cook, supra annot. 109, at 239.
Cook also notes that "[a]s an overqualified woman who found her opportunities only in minor
public offices below the national level, she developed a commitment to state and local
government, legislative responsibility, and judicial modesty." Id.
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McFeatters offers a biographical account of Justice O'Connor's life and
professional achievements. The work sketches Justice O'Connor's childhood
on the Lazy B Ranch, through her appointment to the Supreme Court, and her
years serving on the Court. McFeatters also reflects on Justice O'Connor's
personal life, balancing marriage, three children, and a demanding career in
public service. In the Epilogue, McFeatters provides a thoughtful discussion of
Justice O'Connor's resignation from the Court and the potential impact of this
void. Id. at 211-18. Although this biography includes a useful bibliography
and index, the text does not contain footnotes.
113. DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE 50 MOST INFLUENTIAL WOMEN IN
AMERICAN LAw 207 (1996). Situating Justice O'Connor among the "earliest
trailblazers" in the legal profession and contemporary, notable female lawyers,
Berry provides a short but detailed biography in her section on Justice
O'Connor, highlighting the Justice's professional and personal
accomplishments. Id. at xi, 207-13.
D. Tributes to Justice O'Connor
1. By Supreme Court Justices
114. Anthony M. Kennedy, William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O'Connor:
An Expression of Appreciation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1663 (2006). Beginning
with a tribute to the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author discusses how the
West not only shaped the former Chief Justice, but also Justice O'Connor and
contributed to her judicial philosophy. Justice Kennedy characterizes Justice
O'Connor's approach to decision-making as case-by-case, marked by the
notion of utility, which is rooted in her upbringing on a ranch in a young state
in the West. Id. at 1669-71.
115. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on Arizona's Pace-Setting Justices:
William Hubbs Rehnquist and Sandra Day O'Connor, 49 ARIz. L. REV. 1
(2007)."' In these remarks, Justice Ginsburg "reflect[s] on the contributions
• . . to the health and well-being of the Court" by Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor. Id. at 1. Justice Ginsburg characterizes Justice O'Connor as the
jurist who has made the greatest contribution to collegiality among the Court
members and their international counterparts. Id. at 6. In addition, the tribute
includes charming observations and anecdotes about Justice O'Connor, among
others, that Justice O'Connor wore "collars from British gowns, and a 'frilly'
French foulard." Id. at 4. So as not to be outdone by the women on the Court,
111. This tribute elaborates on another one of Justice Ginsburg's remarks published in an
earlier piece. See Ginsburg, Reflections on Arizona's Pace-Setting Justices, supra annot. 115, at
1 n.* (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 119 HARV. L.
REv. 1239 (2006), infra annot. 116).
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Justice Ginsberg states, Chief Justice Rehnquist wore a robe that he copied
from the Lord Chancellor in a local production of Gilbert and Sullivan's
Jolanthe. Id.
116. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1239 (2006). In this tribute, which the Harvard Law Review
dedicated to Justice O'Connor "[o]n the occasion of her retirement from the
Supreme Court," Justice Ginsburg characterizes O'Connor as in her other
tributes. l l 2 Id. at 1239. Justice Ginsburg remarks that in the twelve years that
she and Justice O'Connor shared seats on the Supreme Court Bench, Justice
O'Connor displayed energy and enthusiasm, even when recovering from breast
cancer, and presented her views at Supreme Court conferences in a direct,
colloquial manner."' Id. at 1240-41. Justice Ginsburg also reflects on the
Court's decisions striking down gender stereotypes, from Justice O'Connor's
decision in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,114 which was decided
by a five-to-four vote, to Justice Ginsburg's decision in United States v.
Virginia, 115 which was decided by a seven-to-one vote. Id. at 1241-42.
117. Stephen G. Breyer, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1242 (2006). Justice Breyer reflects on Justice O'Connor's
accessibility, which was demonstrated in her commitment to the rule of law,
professionalism, and public service for lawyers. Id. at 1246. He commented
on two cases decided at the end of Justice O'Connor's tenure on the Court that
illustrate her "practical understanding of the institutional role that courts must
play in America's system of government" where democratic values, protection
of basic human freedoms, respect for all citizens, and separation of powers are
preserved among different levels of government. Id. at 1243. Those cases are
Grutter v. Bollinger 16 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.117
112. See id at 6-9.
113. Justice Ginsburg notes that Justice O'Connor's civil style is in contrast to fellow
Supreme Court Justices. Id. at 1241 n.6-8 (citing several opinions to illustrate cases where
Justices used uncivil language: County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 685 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
114. 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (holding that a state-supported university's admission policy
that limited nursing school's enrollment to women, thereby denying admission to qualified men,
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
115. 518 U.S. 515, 530-31, 534 (1996) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause was
violated because the Commonwealth did not show an exceedingly persuasive justification for
excluding women from the Virginia Military Institute).
116. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
117. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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2. By Members of the Legal Profession
118. Scott Bales, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: No Insurmountable
Hurdles, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1705 (2006). Bales served as Justice O'Connor's
law clerk during the 1984 October Term, and believes "she is regarded as the
world's most influential woman lawyer, both for her role on the Court and as a
global spokesperson for judicial independence and the rule of law." Id. at 1705
& n.*. His tribute provides biographical details from her childhood on the
Lazy B Ranch to her work on the Supreme Court.
119. Michelle T. Friedland, A Wise Justice, and a Great Boss, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1717 (2006). Friedland served as Justice O'Connor's clerk during the
2001 October Term, and she movingly describes how Justice O'Connor "lived
life to the fullest." Id. at 1717 n.*, 1719. Examples include Justice
O'Connor's morning aerobics class at the Supreme Court's basketball court,
"often referred to as 'the highest court in the land,"' impromptu field trips to
baseball games and the Smithsonian Institution (among other destinations), a
willingness to chat with strangers, and frequent yet inventive cooking that she
would share with her clerks. Id. at 1717.
120. Kent D. Syverud, Lessons from Working for Sandra Day O'Connor, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2006). Syverud served as Justice O'Connor's law clerk
during the 1984 October Term. Id. at 1721 n.*. In this tribute, he comments
on her reflective method of decision-making, narrow application of theory to
the specific set of facts presented, appreciation of all sides and perspective of a
well-reasoned argument, and faith manifest in public service. The tribute also
includes refreshing anecdotes and observations, such as how Justice O'Connor
did not like footnotes in memos or opinions, and that she called her clerks'
children "grandclerks" and allowed them to be brought to chambers when
work and family demands so required. Id. at 1733.
121. Glen D. Nager, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1248 (2006). As an O'Connor law clerk during the 1983 October
Term, Nager reflects on Justice O'Connor's "admirable nonjudicial personae."
Id. at 1248 & n.*. In his tribute, he describes the Justice's admiration of the
institution of marriage, having a penchant for matchmaking, commitment to
family, affection for her western heritage, her adept (but appropriately private)
sense of humor, and enthusiasm for sports and exercise. Nager also
characterizes Justice O'Connor as deeply committed to, and loving of, her
country and its people.
122. Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1251 (2006). Sullivan identifies three roles in Justice
O'Connor's life that "left indelible traces in Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence
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while on the Court." Id. at 1252. Justice O'Connor's roles as a judge,
legislator, and westerner marked her development of case law, and Sullivan
explains the cases reflecting these three roles.
123. Viet D. Dinh, First Impressions: A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 3 (1997). Dinh, a former law clerk for
Justice O'Connor, reflects on her commitment to federalism in this tribute.
Observing that behind her adherence to state sovereignty, separation of
powers, and the democratic process, Justice O'Connor harbors a profound
concern and caring for people. In Dinh's words, Justice O'Connor's
federalism "fosters human capacity for self-governance." Id. at 8.
